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The attorney-client relationship is understood by lawyers and the
public to be infused with confidentiality, and the attorney-client
privilege, which is essential to this sensitive and important relationship,
is much revered. As vital as it may be, however, the attorney-client
privilege is narrowly construed, laden with exceptions, and easily
waived. On the theory that the attorney-client privilege is intended for
use as a shield and not as a sword, it may be lost if a litigant asserts a
claim or defense that requires inquiry into the litigant's privileged
communications with its lawyer to fairly rebut or refute. This principle
is commonly described as the "at-issue exception" to the attorney-client
privilege. The at-issue exception represents the most frightening type of
privilege forfeiture because the law does not clearly warn clients of its
risk and because lawyers may not realize its effect in time to avoid
calamity. For this reason, lawyers must understand courts' analysis and
application of the at-issue exception. This article advances that process.
In doing so, it carefully examines and critiques the three principal tests
courts use to decide whether the at-issue exception applies, and discusses
* Managing Director, Aon Professional Services, Overland Park, Kansas.
J.D., University of Kansas. Opinions expressed here a the author's alone.
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several types of cases and circumstances in which lawyers seem
especially prone to missing the serious threat to the attorney-client
privilege that the at-issue exception potentially poses.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The attorney-client relationship is understood by lawyers and the
public to be infused with confidentiality, and the attorney-client
privilege, which is essential to this sensitive and important relationship,
is much revered.' As vital as it may be, however, the attorney-client
privilege is not absolute.2 Indeed, it is not as broad or protective as most
clients and many lawyers believe.3 To the contrary, the attorney-client
privilege is narrowly construed, laden with exceptions, and easily
waived.
1. See Commonwealth v. Chmiel, 738 A.2d 406, 414 (Pa. 1999) (describing the
attorney-client privilege as "the most revered of the common law privileges").
2. In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 745 F.3d 681, 687 (3d Cir. 2014); DCP Midstream,
LP v. Anadarko Petrol. Corp., 303 P.3d 1187, 1198 (Colo. 2013); Adams v. Franklin, 924
A.2d 993, 999 (D.C. 2007); 100 Harborview Dr. Condo. Council of Unit Owners v.
Clark, 119 A.3d 87, 113 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2015); Culbertson v. Culbertson, 455
S.W.3d 107, 132 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2014); Youkers v. State, 400 S.W.3d 200, 212 (Tex.
App. 2013).
3. See EDNA S. EPSTEIN, THE ArrORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE AND THE WORK-
PRODUCT DOCTRINE 6 (5th ed. 2007) ("Many communications that clients and attorneys
alike believe will be privileged are not.").
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On the theory that the attorney-client privilege is intended for use as
a shield and not as a sword, it may be lost if a litigant asserts a claim or
defense that requires inquiry into the litigant's privileged
communications with its lawyer to fairly rebut or refute.4 This principle
is commonly described as the "at-issue exception" to the attorney-client
privilege.'
Unfortunately, even essential aspects of at-issue doctrine that
lawyers should grasp-such as merely filing suit does not put at issue
attorney-client communications forming the basis for the plaintiffs
complaint or petition,6 a defendant's denial of allegations does not put at
issue related communications with her lawyer,' and neither a plaintiff nor
a defendant may place an opponent's privileged communications at issue
by its own pleading of claims or defenses8-are often contested, and
4. CR-RSC Tower I, LLC v. RSC Tower I, LLC, 56 A.3d 170, 198-207 (Md.
2012).
5. See, e.g., Alaska Elec. Pension Fund v. Brown, 988 A.2d 412, 419 (Del. 2010)
(discussing the "at issue exception" to the attorney-client privilege); Aimee B. Anderson,
Preserving the Confidentiality of Investigations by In-House and Outside Counsel, in
ArrORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE IN CIVIL LITIGATION 223, 233 (Vincent S. Walkowiak ed.,
3d ed. 2004) ("The 'at-issue xception' comes into play by virtue of a party's reliance on
a privileged communication as an essential part of its claim or defense. Fairness requires
such an exception.") (footnotes omitted); Kenneth Duvall, Rules, Standards, and the
Attorney-Client Privilege: When the Privilege is "At-Issue" in the Discovery Rule
Context, 32 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 1, 2 (2011) ("In recent decades, the privilege battles have
in large part been waged over one particular exception to the privilege-the 'at-issue'
carve-out.").
6. See, e.g., Guar. Ins. Co. v. Heffernan Ins. Brokers, Inc., 300 F.R.D. 590, 593-94
(S.D. Fla. 2014) (stating that under Florida law, a party does not waive the attorney-client
privilege simply by bringing a lawsuit); Navajo Nation v. Peabody Holding Co., 255
F.R.D. 37, 50 (D.D.C. 2009) (finding that the Navajo did not place the advice of their
counsel at issue through claims of fraudulent concealment and affirmative reliance even
though such evidence might be relevant o their claims); Empire W. Title Agency, L.L.C.
v. Talamante ex rel. Cty. of Maricopa, 323 P.3d 1148, 1150 (Ariz. 2014) (noting the
court's continuing position "that merely filing an action or denying an allegation does not
waive the [attorney-client] privilege").
7. See, e.g., Lorenz v. Valley Forge Ins. Co., 815 F.2d 1095, 1098 (7th Cir. 1987)
("To waive the attorney-client privilege by voluntarily injecting an issue in the case, a
defendant must do more than merely deny a plaintiff's allegations."); Smith v. Scottsdale
Ins. Co., 40 F. Supp. 3d 704, 724 (N.D. W. Va. 2014) (discussing the at-issue doctrine
and stating that "[i]f merely denying the allegations in a complaint waived the attorney-
client privilege, the privilege would be moot"); Shukh v. Seagate Tech., LLC, 872 F.
Supp. 2d 851, 857 (D. Minn. 2012); Empire W. Title Agency, L.L.C., 323 P.3d at 1150
(reminding lawyers "that merely ... denying an allegation does not waive the [attorney-
client] privilege").
8. See, e.g., Exec. Mgmt. Servs., Inc. v. Fifth Third Bank, 309 F.R.D. 455, 462
(S.D. Ind. 2015) (explaining that a defendant's assertion of affirmative defenses cannot
have the effect of waiving the plaintiffs attorney-client privilege); Gardner v. Major
Auto. Cos., Inc., No. 11 Civ. 1664(FB)(VMS), 2014 WL 1330961, at *7 (E.D.N.Y. Mar.
31, 2014) (rejecting the plaintiffs' argument that the allegations in their complaint forced
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harder issues remain. In short, many lawyers either do not understand
the at-issue exception to the privilege or fail to appreciate its application.
Their misunderstanding or insensitivity perhaps matches courts'
struggles to characterize at-issue doctrine. This uncertainty is capsulized
in the following question: does a party's loss of the privilege by placing
confidential attorney-client communications at issue reflect an exception
to the privilege or is it a form of a waiver? There is no clear answer.
If you reason that an "exception" to the privilege should be
understood to refer to a situation in which the privilege does not attach to
an attorney-client communication i the first place,9 then describing at-
issue doctrine as an exception to the privilege seems wrong because it
operates to strip an otherwise privileged communication of its protection.
Yet there are other situations in which a client relinquishes the attorney-
client privilege after it has attached that are also characterized as
exceptions.'0
Describing at-issue doctrine as a form of waiver is equally
unsatisfying. On the one hand, "waiver" generally describes the
intentional or voluntary relinquishment of a known right or privilege,"
and at-issue doctrine is often invoked where a party defends allegations
against it on the basis that it acted on advice of counsel.12  In that
instance, waiver would appear to be an apt characterization of the
doctrine.3  On the other hand, a party may put privileged
the defendants to put their lawyer's advice at issue); Fischel & Kahn, Ltd. v. van Straaten
Gallery, Inc., 727 N.E.2d 240, 244 (Ill. 2000) ("To allow Fischel & Kahn to invade the
attorney-client privilege .. . simply by filing the affirmative defenses it did would render
the privilege illusory with respect to the communications between van Straaten and Pope
& John. Thus ... the allegations raised in Fischel & Kahn's affirmative defenses were
insufficient to put the cause of van Straaten's damages at issue, resulting in waiver of the
attorney-client privilege in this case.").
9. See Squire, Sanders & Dempsey, L.L.P. v. Givaudan Flavors Corp., 937 N.E.2d
533, 543 (Ohio 2010) (distinguishing exceptions from waivers for purposes of Ohio's
attorney-client privilege statute).
10. See, e.g., id. at 541 (discussing the self-protection or self-defense xception to
the attorney-client privilege).
11. Wiggins v. State, 782 S.E.2d 31, 35 (Ga. 2016) (quoting Taylor v. Ricketts, 238
S.E.2d 52, 54 (Ga. 1977)); State v. McSwine, 873 N.W.2d 405, 420 (Neb. 2016).
12. Advice of counsel is not a true affirmative defense to allegations of misconduct;
rather, good faith reliance on advice of counsel negates the element of wrongful intent
that may be required for conviction or liability. See United States v. Peterson, 101 F.3d
375, 381-82 (5th Cir. 1996) (discussing criminal liability for securities fraud); see also
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 29(1) (AM. LAW INST. 2000)
("When a client's intent or mental state is in issue, a tribunal may consider otherwise
admissible evidence of a lawyer's advice to the client.").
13. See, e.g., Chen-Oster v. Goldman, Sachs & Co., 293 F.R.D. 547, 556 (S.D.N.Y.
2013) ("Assertion of an advice of counsel defense is the 'quintessential example' of an
implied waiver.") (quoting In re Cty. of Erie, 546 F.3d 222, 228 (2d Cir. 2008)).
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communications at issue and thus lose confidentiality without meaning to
do so.14  In that case, waiver terminology seems fundamentally
misplaced. And, if there were a third hand, at-issue doctrine might be
described as an implied or implicit waiver of the attorney-client privilege
despite a lack of intent to waive, because in contrast to other areas of the
law, waiver in the attorney-client privilege context does not require
intentional or knowing conduct by the waiving party.'5 Rather, a party
may waive the privilege inadvertently or through conduct that would
make it unfair to later assert the privilege in connection with that
conduct.16 In fact, in the attorney-client privilege context, waiver is but
"a loose and misleading label for . .. a collection of different rules
addressed to different problems."7
Ultimately, terminology is unimportant. Practically what matters is
that the at-issue exception represents "the most frightening type" of
privilege forfeiture "because the law does not clearly warn clients of its
risk and because lawyers may not realize its effect in time to avoid
disaster."'8 For this reason, lawyers must understand courts' analysis
and application of the at-issue exception regardless of how they describe
it.1 9 This article is intended to advance that process.
Looking ahead, Part II of this article provides a short primer on the
attorney-client privilege. Some foundational knowledge of the privilege
is required to understand the at-issue exception. Part III examines the
three principal tests courts use to decide whether the at-issue exception
applies. These tests are derived from the decisions in Hearn v. Rhay,20 In
re County of Erie,21 and Rhone-Poulenc Rorer Inc. v. Home Indemnity
Co. 22 This Part concludes that the Rhone-Poulenc test is superior to the
other two, and recommends that courts adopt it. Finally, Part IV
discusses several types of cases and circumstances in which lawyers
seem especially prone to missing the serious threat to the attorney-client
privilege that the at-issue exception potentially poses.
14. THOMAS E. SPAHN, THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE AND WORK PRODUCT
DOCTRINE: A PRACTITIONER'S GUIDE 773 (3d ed. 2013).
15. EPSTEIN, supra note 3, at 390-91.
16. Id. at 391.
17. United States v. Mass. Inst. of Tech., 129 F.3d 681, 684 (1st Cir. 1997).
18. SPAHN, supra note 14, at 773.
19. See id (asserting that "courts' nomenclature is not as important as their
analyses" of the at-issue exception).
20. 68 F.R.D. 574 (E.D. Wash. 1975).
21. 546 F.3d 222 (2d Cir. 2008).
22. 32 F.3d 851 (3d Cir. 1994).
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II. A PRIMER ON THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE
The attorney-client privilege is one of the oldest common law
privileges protecting confidential communications,23 and it is now widely
codified.24 "The privilege allows for open communications between an
attorney and his or her client, free from apprehension of compelled
disclosures, thereby enabling the attorney to gather complete and
accurate information about the client's situation."25  Recognizing the
26privilege also encourages the public to seek early legal assistance.
The "foundational building blocks"27 of the attorney-client privilege
were announced nearly 70 years ago in United States v. United Shoe
Machinery Corp.28  The United Shoe test famously provides that the
privilege applies if:
(1) the asserted holder of the privilege is or sought to become a
client; (2) the person to whom the communication was made (a) is the
member of the bar of court, or his subordinate and (b) in connection
with this communication is acting as a lawyer; (3) the communication
relates to a fact of which the attorney was informed (a) by his client
(b) without the presence of strangers (c) for the purpose of securing
primarily either (i) an opinion of law or (ii) legal services or (iii)
assistance in some legal proceeding, and not (d) for the purpose of
23. Swidler & Berlin v. United States, 524 U.S. 399, 403 (1998); Wal-Mart Stores,
Inc. v. Ind. Elec. Workers Pension Tr. Fund IBEW, 95 A.3d 1264, 1278 (Del: 2014); Ctr.
Partners, Ltd. v. Growth Head GP, LLC, 981 N.E.2d 345, 355 (Ill. 2012); Wemark v.
State, 602 N.W.2d 810, 815 (Iowa 1999); State v. Gonzalez, 234 P.3d 1, 12 (Kan. 2010);
Suffolk Constr. Co. v. Div. of Capital Asset Mgmt., 870 N.E.2d 33, 38 (Mass. 2007)
(quoting Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981)); In re Miller, 584
S.E.2d 772, 782 (N.C. 2003); Frease v. Glazer, 4 P.3d 56, 60 (Or. 2000); Nationwide
Mut. Ins. Co. v. Fleming, 924 A.2d 1259, 1263 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2007); In re XL Specialty
Ins. Co., 373 S.W.3d 46, 49 (Tex. 2012) (quoting United States v. Zolin, 491 U.S. 554,
562 (1989)); Doe v. Maret, 984 P.2d 980, 982 (Utah 1999).
24. See, e.g., CAL. EvID. CODE §§ 950-62 (2016); FLA. STAT. § 90.502 (2015); KAN.
STAT. ANN. § 60-426 (2013).
25. Neuman v. State, 773 S.E.2d 716, 719 (Ga. 2015); see also Cedell v. Farmers
Ins. Co. of Wash., 295 P.3d 239, 249 (Wash. 2013) ("The purpose of [the] attorney-client
privilege is to allow clients to fully inform their attorneys of all relevant facts without
fear of consequent disclosure.").
26. Genova v. Longs Peak Emergency Physicians, P.C., 72 P.3d 454, 461-62 (Colo.
Ct. App. 2003) (quoting Nat'l Farmers Union Prop. & Cas. Co. v. Dist. Ct., 718 P.2d
1044 (Colo. 1986)); McLaughlin v. Freedom of Info. Comm'n, 850 A.2d 254, 258 (Conn.
App. Ct. 2004).
27. Henry S. Bryans, Employed Lawyers and the Attorney-Client Privilege-
Parsing the Trade-Offs, 47 U. TOL. L. REv. 109, 114 (2015).
28. 89 F. Supp. 357 (D. Mass. 1950).
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committing a crime or tort; and 4) the privilege has been (a) claimed
and (b) not waived by the client.
The Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers articulates
the elements of the attorney-client privilege more succinctly.30 Section
68 provides that the privilege may be asserted "with respect to: (1) a
communication (2) made between privileged persons (3) in confidence
(4) for the purpose of obtaining or providing legal assistance for the
client."3 1  Continuing, section 70 explains that "privileged persons"
include the client or prospective client, the lawyer, agents of the client or
prospective client and the lawyer who facilitate communications between
them, and agents of the lawyer who assist in the client's representation.32
The right to assert the attorney-client privilege belongs to the
client.33 When a lawyer invokes the privilege to prevent the disclosure of
confidential communications, she does so as the client's agent-not as a
holder of the privilege.34 Similarly, if the lawyer waives the privilege,
she does so as the client's agent rather than as the owner of the
privilege.35
29. Id. at 358-59. Although the United Shoe test implies that the privilege covers
only communications from the client to the attorney, that is not correct; confidential
communications from an attorney to a client are also privileged. The attorney-client
privilege is a two-way street. United States v. Christensen, 801 F.3d 970, 1007 (9th Cir.
2015) (applying federal privilege law); Byrd v. State, 929 S.W.2d 151, 154 (Ark. 1996);
Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 730 A.2d 51, 60 (Conn. 1999); Clausen v.
Nat'l Grange Mut. Ins. Co., 730 A.2d 133, 137-38 (Del. Super. Ct. 1997); People v.
Radojcic, 998 N.E.2d 1212, 1221 (Ill. 2013); Squealer Feeds v. Pickering, 530 N.W.2d
678, 684 (Iowa 1995); Rent Control Bd. v. Praught, 619 N.E.2d 346, 350 (Mass. App. Ct.
1993); Shorter v. State, 33 So. 3d 512, 516 (Miss. Ct. App. 2009) (quoting Hewes v.
Langston, 853 So. 2d 1237, 1244 (Miss. 2003)); Palmer v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 861 P.2d
895, 906 (Mont. 1993); Gillard v. AIG Ins. Co., 15 A.3d 44, 59 (Pa. 2011); Giammarco v.
Giammarco, 959 A.2d 531, 533 (R.I. 2008) (quoting Mortg. Guar. & Title Co. v. Cunha,
745 A.2d 156, 158-59 (R.I. 2000)); Boyd v. Comdata Network, Inc., 88 S.W.3d 203, 213
(Tenn. Ct. App. 2002); Zink v. City of Mesa, 256 P.3d 384, 403 (Wash. Ct. App. 2011);
State ex rel. Montpelier U.S. Ins. Co. v. Bloom, 757 S.E.2d 788, 994 (W. Va. 2014)
(quoting FRANKU.N D. CLECKLEY ET AL., LITIGATION HANDBOOK ON WEST VIRGINIA
RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE § 26(b)(1), at 693 (4th ed. 2012)).
30. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 68 (AM. LAW INST.
2000).
31. Id.
32. Id. § 70.
33. Holt v. McCastlain, 182 S.W.3d 112, 117 (Ark. 2004); OXY Res. Cal. LLC v.
Super. Ct., 9 Cal. Rptr. 3d 621, 644-45 (Ct. App. 2004); Ctr. Partners, Ltd. v. Growth
Head GP, LLC, 981 N.E.2d 345, 356 (Ill. 2012); Arnoldy v. Mahoney, 791 N.W.2d 645,
657 (S.D. 2010).
34. See EPSTEIN, supra note 3, at 25 (discussing who may act on a client's behalf to
assert or waive the attorney-client privilege).
35. See, e.g., San Francisco Residence Club, Ltd. v. Baswell-Guthrie, 897 F. Supp.
2d 1122, 1216 (N.D. Ala. 2012) ("The principle that the client, and not the attorney, owns
2016] 7
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The privilege attaches to initial consultations between attorneys and
prospective clients, even if the client does not ultimately retain the
attorney.3 6 Thereafter, the client may invoke the privilege any time
during the attorney-client relationship or after the relationship
terminates.37 The privilege even survives the client's death.
Because the privilege attaches to communications, an otherwise
privileged exchange between a client and a lawyer containing
information that could be discovered by other means remains shielded
from discovery.39 There is, however, no blanket privilege covering all
attorney-client communications.40 The client must assert the privilege
with respect to each communication in question, and the court hearing
the matter must scrutinize each communication independently.41 The
party asserting the attomey-client privilege bears the burden of
establishing its application to particular communications.4 2 This is a
fact-specific inquiry.43 The form of the communication between the
the privilege, means that [the clients] had the right to waive the privilege, and that waiver
may be effected through their attorney, i.e., their agent.").
36. Barton v. United States Dist. Ct. for the Cent. Dist. of Cal., 410 F.3d 1104, 1111
(9th Cir. 2005) (applying California law); State v. Fodor, 880 P.2d 662, 669 (Ariz. Ct.
App. 1994); Popp v. O'Neil, 730 N.E.2d 506, 511 (Ill. App. Ct. 2000); Lovell v.
Winchester, 941 S.W.2d 466, 467 (Ky. 1997); Mixon v. State, 224 S.W.3d 206, 212
(Tex. App. 2007).
37. See O'Boyle v. Borough of Longport, 94 A.3d 299, 309 (N.J. 2014) (noting that
the privilege survives the termination of the attorney-client relationship).
38. Swidler & Berlin v. United States, 524 U.S. 399, 405 (1998); Zook v. Pesce, 91
A.3d 1114, 1119 (Md. 2014); see also In re Miller, 584 S.E.2d 772, 779 (N.C. 2003)
(collecting state court cases on this point).
39. Costco Wholesale Corp. v. Super. Ct., 219 P.3d 736, 741 (Cal. 2009).
40. DCP Midstream, LP v. Anadarko Petroleum Corp., 303 P.3d 1187, 1199 (Colo.
2013); see also Scott v. Peterson, 126 P.3d 1232, 1234 (Okla. 2005) ("[T]he mere status
of an attorney-client relationship does not make every communication between attorney
and client protected by the privilege.").
41. Wesp v. Everson, 33 P.3d 191, 197 (Colo. 2001); Brown v. Katz, 868 N.E.2d
1159, 1167 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007).
42. Cencast Servs., L.P. v. United States, 91 Fed. Cl. 496, 502 (Fed. Cl. 2010);
Wesp, 33 P.3d at 198; In re Dole Food Co., 114 A.3d 541, 561 (Del. Ch. 2014) (quoting
Moyer v. Moyer, 602 A.2d 68, 72 (Del.1992)); Lender Processing Servs., Inc. v. Arch
Ins. Co., 183 So. 3d 1052, 1059 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2015); Kirk v. Ford Motor Co., 116
P.3d 27, 34 (Idaho 2005); Collins v. Braden, 384 S.W.3d 154, 161, 163 (Ky. 2012);
Maldonado v. Kiewit La. Co., 152 So. 3d 909, 927 (La. Ct. App. 2014); Clair v. Clair,
982 N.E.2d 32, 40-41 (Mass. 2013); State er rel. Koster v. Cain, 383 S.W.3d 105, 116
(Mo. Ct. App. 2012); State ex rel. AMISUB, Inc. v. Buckley, 618 N.W.2d 684, 694 (Neb.
2000); Bhandari v. Artesia Gen. Hosp., 317 P.3d 856, 860 (N.M. Ct. App. 2013); Ambac
Assur. Corp. v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 998 N.Y.S.2d 329, 333 (N.Y. App. Div.
2014); In re E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 136 S.W.3d 218, 223 (Tex. 2004); State ex
rel. HCR Manorcare, LLC v. Stucky, 776 S.E.2d 271, 282 (W. Va. 2015); Dishman v.
First Interstate Bank, 362 P.3d 360, 367 (Wyo. 2015).
43. State ex rel. Koster, 383 S.W.3d at 118.
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client and the lawyer is irrelevant to attorney-client privilege analysis as
long as the communication otherwise qualifies as privileged. For
example, the privilege attaches to telephone calls, personal
conversations, correspondence, notes, text messages, and e-mail
messages." Nonverbal communications between clients and lawyers-
such as nods and silence-may be privileged.45
A party seeking to protect written or electronic communications
from discovery does not have to identify them as "privileged" or
"confidential" for the attorney-client privilege to attach.46 On the other
hand, a party cannot shield a communication from discovery simply by
branding it "confidential" or "privileged."47  The test is whether a
communication satisfies the elements necessary to establish the
privilege-not how it is identified or labeled. Similarly, a client cannot
cloak a communication in the attorney-client privilege simply by routing
it through a lawyer.48  Again, a communication must bear all of the
hallmarks of the privilege for it to be protected.49
The attorney-client privilege benefits organizations as well as
individuals. For example, corporations can assert the attorney-client
privilege,0  as can partnerships,5 1  limited liability companies,5 2
44. See EPSTEIN, supra note 3, at 66 (stating that a privileged communication "may
be oral or written").
45. Id.
46. See, e.g., Baptiste v. Cushman & Wakefield, Inc., No. 03Civ.2102(RCC)(THK),
2004 WL 330235, at *1-2 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 20, 2004) (rejecting the argument that failing
to label an e-mail message as privileged deprived it of privileged status); Blumenthal v.
Kimber Mfg., Inc., 826 A.2d 1088, 1098 (Conn. 2003) (discussing e-mail and stating:
"Whether a document expressly is marked as 'confidential' is not dispositive, but is
merely one factor a court may consider in determining confidentiality."); Chrysler Corp.
v. Sheridan, No. 227511, 2001 WL 773099, at *3 (Mich. Ct. App. July 10, 2001)
(involving the inadvertent disclosure of an e-mail message that was not identified as
"privileged" or "confidential").
47. Blumenthal, 826 A.2d at 1098; cf Ledgin v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Kan.
City, 166 F.R.D. 496, 499 (D. Kan. 1996) (describing a party's document stamp of
"attorney work product" as a "self-serving embellishment" that did not preclude
discovery).
48. Stopka v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., 816 F. Supp. 2d 516, 528 (N.D. Ill. 2011)
(quoting Equity Residential v. Kendall Risk Mgmt., Inc., 246 F.R.D. 557, 563 (N.D. Ill.
2007)); Opus Corp. v. IBM., 956 F. Supp. 1503, 1510 (D. Minn. 1996); U.S. Postal Serv.
v. Phelps Dodge Ref. Corp., 852 F. Supp. 156, 160 (E.D.N.Y. 1994); Va. Elec. & Power
Co. v. Westmoreland-LG & E Partners, 526 S.E.2d 750, 755 (Va. 2000).
49. Stopka, 816 F. Supp. 2d at 528.
50. Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Weintraub, 471 U.S. 343, 348 (1985);
In re Teleglobe Commc'n Corp., 493 F.3d 345, 360 (3d Cir. 2007); St. Simons
Waterfront, LLC v. Hunter, Maclean, Exley & Dunn, P.C., 746 S.E.2d 98, 103 (Ga.
2013); State ex rel. HCR Manorcare, LLC v. Stucky, 776 S.E.2d 271, 282 (W. Va. 2015).
51. See, e.g., In re Bieter Co., 16 F.3d 929, 935 (8th Cir. 1994).
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governmental agencies or units,53 and trusts.54 Organizations may claim
the privilege with respect to communications with in-house counsel.s
In the organizational context, the most common problem is
determining who among the entity's employees may speak on its behalf.
This analysis is complicated by the fact that the group that constitutes the
client for purposes of creating the attorney-client privilege is larger than
the group that is permitted to assert or waive the privilege.16 Courts have
traditionally applied two tests to analyze organizational privilege claims:
the "control group" test and the "subject matter" test. A few courts have
adopted a third test that closely tracks the subject matter test," and which
is sometimes called the "modified subject matter test."58
Applying the control group test, communications must be made by
an employee who is positioned "to control or take a substantial part in
the determination of corporate action in response to legal advice" for the
privilege to attach. Only these employees qualify as the "client" for
attorney-client privilege purposes.60 The control group test essentially
52. See, e.g., Carpenters Pension Tr. v. Lindquist Family LLC, No. C-13-01063
DMR, 2014 WL 1569195, at *3-4 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 18, 2014) (applying corporate
attorney-client privilege law to an LLC); Montgomery v. eTreppid Techs., LLC, 548 F.
Supp. 2d 1175, 1179-87 (D. Nev. 2008) (reasoning that an LLC should be treated like a
corporation for purposes of federal common law attorney-client privilege).
53. See, e.g., Sandra T.E. v. S. Berywn Sch. Dist. 100, 600 F.3d 612, 621 (7th Cir.
2009) ("The public interest is best served when agencies of the government have access
to the confidential advice of counsel regarding the legal consequences of their ...
activities and how to conform their future operations to the requirements of the law.");
Suffolk Constr. Co. v. Div. of Capital Asset Mgmt., 870 N.E.2d 33, 38 (Mass. 2007)
(stating that "confidential communications between public officers and employees and
governmental entities and their legal counsel undertaken for the purpose of obtaining
legal advice or assistance are protected under the normal rules of the attorney-client
privilege") (footnote omitted).
54. Snow, Christensen & Martineau v. Lindberg, 299 P.3d 1058, 1066-67 (Utah
2013).
55. Avid Tech., Inc. v. Media Gobbler, Inc., Civ. A. No. 14-13746-PBS, 2016 WL
696092, at *3 (D. Mass. Feb. 19, 2016); New Jersey v. Sprint Corp., 258 F.R.D. 421, 425
(D. Kan. 2009); Fla. Marlins Baseball Club, LLC v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd's
London, 900 So. 2d 720, 721 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2005); St. Simon's Waterfront, LLC,
746 S.E.2d at 103; RFF Family P'ship, LP v. Burns & Levinson, LLP, 991 N.E.2d 1066,
1071 (Mass. 2013).
56. There may further be overlapping or related questions about whether an
employee's communications are covered by the individual employee's attorney-client
privilege or whether the organization's attorney-client privilege applies. See Keefe v.
Bernard, 774 N.W.2d 663, 669-72 (Iowa 2009) (discussing this overlap).
57. In re Bieter Co., 16 F.3d 929, 935-36 (8th Cir. 1994).
58. See, e.g., Baisley v. Missiquoi Cemetery Ass'n, 708 A.2d 924, 931 (Vt. 1998)
("Following Upjohn, two tests have emerged to define the client in the corporate context:
the subject-matter test, and the modified subject-matter test.").
59. EPSTEIN, supra note 3, at 142.
60. Id.
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requires that the employee with whom an attorney communicates be a
member of senior management for the communication to be privileged.
The control group test has been criticized because it chills corporate
communications, frustrates the purpose of the attorney-client privilege by
discouraging subordinate employees from sharing important information
with corporate counsel, makes it difficult for corporate counsel to
properly advise their clients and to ensure their clients' compliance with
the law, and yields unpredictable results.6 1 Nonetheless, a handful of
jurisdictions adhere to this test.6 2
Some courts, perhaps recognizing the difficulties caused by strict
application of the control group test, have loosened it. In Becker v.
ConAgra Foods, Inc.,63 for example, the court explained that under
Illinois law, "[t]he privilege extends to a control group made up of those
who act as decision-makers and those whose advisory role is such that a
decision would not normally be made without his or her input, and
whose opinion in fact forms the basis of any final decision by those with
authority."64 Thus, under this formulation of the control group test, the
control group may extend beyond the actual corporate decision-makers.65
Even under this more liberal interpretation, however, the control group
test does not protect as privileged lawyers' communications with
employees who merely supply a corporation's decision-makers with
facts.66
The subject matter test affords much broader privilege protection to
corporate clients. Under the subject matter test as originally conceived, a
communication with any employee may be privileged if it is made for the
purpose of securing legal advice for the corporation, the employee is
communicating with the lawyer at a superior's request or direction, and
the employee's responsibilities include the subject of the
67communication. Applying this test, the employee's position or rank is
irrelevant to the privilege analysis.68 The Supreme Court embraced the
subject matter approach in Upjohn Co. v. United States,69 which is
61. See Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 391-93 (1981).
62. See, e.g., Langdon v. Champion, 752 P.2d 999, 1002 (Alaska 1988) (referring to
Alaska Rule of Evidence 503(a)(2)); Bridgeview Health Care Ctr., Ltd. v. State Farm Fire
& Cas. Co., 10 N.E.3d 902, 908 (Ill. 2014) (applying Illinois law).
63. Case No. 10-cv-952-MJR-PMF, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 101187 (S.D. Ill. Sept.
8,2011).
64. Id. at *3.
65. SPAHN, supra note 14, at 108.
66. Id.
67. EPSTEIN, supra note 3, at 143, 145.
68. Id. at 143.
69. 449 U.S. 383 (1981).
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regarded as "the foundational case on attorney-client privilege in the
corporate environment,',70 although the Court declined to formulate a
specific test.71  The Upjohn court's reticence has since led courts to
reason that there are two forms of the subject matter test.2 Regardless, it
is clear following Upjohn that under the subject matter test, however it is
articulated, a lawyer's confidential communications with any employee
are privileged when they concern matters within the scope of the
employee's responsibilities and the employee is aware that the
communication is intended to enable or facilitate the lawyer's
representation of the corporation.7 ' Furthermore, any form of the subject
matter test is superior to the traditional formulation of the control group
test because it recognizes that employees outside the corporate control
group may be aware of facts that are essential to the corporation's need
for, or reliance on, legal advice.74 The subject matter test. also more
realistically reflects the manner in which organizations collect and
process information, and the means by which they make decisions.
The third test, which was formulated before the Supreme Court
embraced the subject matter approach in Upjohn, is often referred to as
the "modified Harper & Row test," or the "Diversified Industries test,"
after the federal appellate cases from which it derives: Harper & Row
70. In re GM LLC Ignition Switch Litig., 80 F. Supp. 3d 521, 527 (S.D.N.Y. 2015)
(noting that in some cases, the privilege may apply to lawyers' communications with
former employees of a corporation).
71. Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 396.
72. See, e.g., Baisley v. Missiquoi Cemetery Ass'n, 708 A.2d 924, 931 (Vt. 1998)
("Following Upjohn, two tests have emerged to define the client in the corporate context:
the subject-matter test, and the modified subject-matter test.").
73. See, e.g., Grand Canyon Skywalk Dev. LLC v. Cieslak, Nos. 2:15-cv-01189-
JAD-GWF, 2:13-cv-00596-JAD-GWF, 2015 WL 4773585, at *8 (D. Nev. Aug. 13,
2015) ("Upjohn holds that the privilege applies to communications with corporate
employees, regardless of their position, when the communications concern matters within
the scope of the employee's corporate duties and the employee is aware that the
information is being furnished to enable the attorney to provide legal advice to the
corporation."); MGA Ent., Inc. v. Nat'l Prods. Ltd., No. CV 10-07083 JAK (SSx), 2012
WL 3150532, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 2, 2012) ("According to the Supreme Court, the
privilege applies to communications by any corporate employee regardless of position
when the communications concern matters within the scope of the employee's corporate
duties and the employee is aware that the information is being furnished to enable the
attorney to provide legal advice to the corporation."); United States v. Ghavami, 882 F.
Supp. 2d 532, 538-39 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) ("Within a corporation, then, the attorney-client
privilege protects communications by corporate employees to counsel for the corporation
who is acting as a lawyer, as long as the communications are made at the direction of
corporate superiors in order to secure legal advice and the employees are aware that they
are being questioned in connection with the provision of such advice.").
74. EPSTEIN, supra note 3, at 144.
75. Id.
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Publishers, Inc. v. Decker,76  and Diversified Industries, Inc. v.
Meredith.n As noted earlier, some courts describe it as the modified
subject matter test.n Using this test:
The attorney-client privilege is applicable to an employee's
communication if (1) the communication was made for the purpose
of securing legal advice; (2) the employee making the
communication did so at the direction of his corporate superior;
(3) the superior made the request so that the corporation could secure
legal advice; (4) the subject matter of the communication is within
the scope of the employee's corporate duties; and (5) the
communication is not disseminated beyond those persons who,
because of the corporate structure, need to know its contents.79
The modified Harper & Row test or Diversified Industries test is
basically the subject matter test with additional limitations,80 hence the
modified subject matter test moniker. The obvious addition to the
subject matter test is the "need to know" element.81  As should be
apparent, the "need" refers to an employee's need for the lawyer's advice
to perform her duties-not to the lawyer's need for the information
known by the employee.82
With respect to partnerships, organizational structure may drive
application of the privilege insofar as partners are concerned. In general
partnerships, all partners may assert the privilege concerning
communications with lawyers about partnership affairs. Limited
partnerships spawn differing views.84 There is authority for the
proposition that limited partners, like general partners, are co-holders of
76. 423 F.2d 487 (7th Cir. 1970).
77. 572 F.2d 596 (8th Cir. 1977).
78. See, e.g., Baisley v. Missiquoi Cemetery Ass'n, 708 A.2d 924, 931 (Vt. 1998).
79. In re Bieter Co., 16 F.3d 929, 936 (8th Cir. 1994) (quoting Diversified Indus.,
Inc. v. Meredith, 572 F.2d 596, 609 (8th Cir. 1977)).
80. Keefe v. Bernard, 774 N.W.2d 663, 671 (Iowa 2009).
81. See also S. Bell Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Deason, 632 So. 2d 1377, 1383 n.10 (Fla.
1994) ("In Diversified Industries .. . the court modified the subject matter test in an effort
to focus on why the attorney was consulted and to prevent the routine channeling of
information through the attorney to prevent subsequent disclosure.").
82. SPAHN, supra note 14, at 118.
83. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 73 cmt. d (AM. LAW
INST. 2000).
84. Limited partnerships must be distinguished from limited liability partnerships
(LLPs). An LLP is a general partnership that has registered as an LLP under a particular
state's laws to obtain statutory protections for its partners against personal liability. See
Douglas R. Richmond, The Partnership Paradigm and Law Firm Non-equity Partners,
58 U. KAN. L. REV. 507, 507 n.2 (2010) (citing Hart v. Theus, Grisham, Davis & Leigh,
L.L.P., 877 So. 2d 1157, 1163 (La. Ct. App. 2004)).
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the partnership's attorney-client privilege.85  There is also a competing
view that limited partners are generally analogous to corporate
shareholders, and therefore cannot invoke the limited partnership's
privilege.86 Under the latter approach, among the partners of a limited
partnership, only the general partners may claim the partnership's
attorney-client privilege. Regardless of whether a partnership is
general or limited, employees of the partnership may serve as its agents
in making privileged communications. Whether a partnership
employee's communications with partnership counsel are privileged is
generally evaluated under any of the tests applied to corporations.89
Courts narrowly or strictly construe the attorney-client privilege
because it limits full disclosure of the truth.90 For example, the privilege
ordinarily does not protect a client's identity.91 The privilege does not
85. See, e.g., Roberts v. Keim, 123 F.R.D. 614, 625 (N.D. Cal. 1988) (concluding
that limited partners and general partners were co-holders of the attorney-client
privilege).




89. See, e.g., In re Bieter Co., 16 F.3d 929, 935 (8th Cir. 1994) (observing that the
Diversified Industries test, "although expressly applicable to corporations and their
employees, is no less instructive as applied to a partnership, or some other client
entity ... and its employees") (footnote omitted); United States v. Daugerdas, 757 F.
Supp. 2d 364, 370 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) ("As an initial matter . .. Field's privilege claim is
properly evaluated under the Teamsters standard [governing communications between
corporate employees and corporate counsel], notwithstanding that BDO is a partnership
rather than a corporation.").
90. In re Pac. Pictures Corp., 679 F.3d 1121, 1126 (9th Cir. 2012); PSE Consulting,
Inc. v. Frank Mercede & Sons, Inc., 838 A.2d 135, 167 (Conn. 2004); Ctr. Partners, Ltd.
v. Growth Head GP, LLC, 981 N.E.2d 345, 356 (Ill. 2012); In re Bryan, 61 P.3d 641, 656
(Kan. 2003); Clair v. Clair, 982 N.E.2d 32, 40 (Mass. 2013); Am. Zurich Ins. Co. v.
Mont. Thirteenth Judicial Dist. Ct., 280 P.3d 240, 245 (Mont. 2012); Walton v. Mid-
Atlantic Spine Specialists, P.C., 694 S.E.2d 545, 549 (Va. 2010) (quoting
Commonwealth v. Edwards, 370 S.E.2d 296, 301 (Va. 1988)); Lane v. Sharp Packaging
Sys., Inc., 640 N.W.2d 788, 798 (Wis. 2002) (quoting cases).
91. Reiserer v. United States, 479 F.3d 1160, 1165-66 (9th Cir. 2007) (explaining
why clients' identities were not incriminating information so as to make privilege
applicable); United States v. BDO Seidman, 337 F.3d 802, 811 (7th Cir. 2003) (noting,
however, that "the identity of a client may be privileged in the rare circumstance when so
much of an actual confidential communication has been disclosed already that merely
identifying the client will effectively disclose that communication"); United States v.
Sindel, 53 F.3d 874, 876 (8th Cir. 1995) (noting exceptions to this rule, all related to
criminal consequences for the client); Tenet Healthcare Corp. v. La. Forum Corp., 538
S.E.2d 441, 444-45 (Ga. 2000) (noting two exceptions: (1) where identifying the client
may expose the client to criminal liability for acts previously committed about which the
client consulted the attorney; and (2) where disclosure of the client's identity would
reveal the substance of confidential attorney-client communications); Nester v. Jernigan,
908 So. 2d 145, 149 (Miss. 2005) (holding that privilege protected a client's identity
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shield from discovery the mere fact that an attorney-client relationship
exists, when that relationship began, the general nature of the services for
which the client retained the attorney, or the terms and conditions of the
92thattorney's engagement. While the privilege protects the content of
attorney-client communications from disclosure, it does not prevent
disclosure of the facts communicated.93 Those facts remain discoverable
by other means. Nor does the attorney-client privilege shield from
discovery communications generated or received by an attorney acting in
some other capacity,4 or communications in which an attorney is giving
business advice rather than legal advice.95
Finally, and as indicated earlier, the attorney-client privilege may be
waived either voluntarily or by implication.96 The most obvious example
of a waiver is a client's knowing revelation of otherwise privileged
information to a third party who is not necessary to the client's
representation.97 In any event, the burden of establishing a waiver
because revealing the client's identity would reveal a confidential communication); Levy
v. Senate of Pa., 65 A.3d 361, 371-72 (Pa. 2013) ("Consistently with many of our sister
courts, we hold that, while a client's identity is generally not privileged, the attorney-
client privilege may apply in cases where divulging the client's identity would disclose
either the legal advice given or the confidential communications provided.").
92. See, e.g., Diversified Indus., Inc. v. Meredith, 572 F.2d 596, 603 (8th Cir. 1977)
(rejecting the privilege with respect to a law firm memorandum); State ex rel. Koster v.
Cain, 383 S.W.3d 105, 119 (Mo. Ct. App. 2012) ("[T]he great weight of authority on the
subject recognizes that with rare exception, the mere fact of the existence of a
relationship between an attorney and a client, and the nature of the fee arrangements
between the attorney and a client are not attorney-client privileged communications.");
Commonwealth v. Chmiel, 889 A.2d 501, 531-32 (Pa. 2005) (determining that a fee
arrangement with a lawyer was not privileged).
93. New Jersey v. Sprint Corp., 258 F.R.D. 421, 426 (D. Kan. 2009) (quoting
Williams v. Sprint/United Mgmt. Co., No. 03-2200, 2006 WL 1867478, at *10 (D. Kan.
July 1, 2006)); Hagans v. Gatorland Kubota, LLC/Sentry Ins., 45 So. 3d 73, 76 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 2010); Collins v. Braden, 384 S.W.3d 154, 159 (Ky. 2012); W. Horizons Living
Ctrs. v. Feland, 853 N.W.2d 36, 41 (N.D. 2014); Snow, Christensen & Martineau v.
Lindberg, 299 P.3d 1058, 1070 (Utah 2013); Youngs v. Peacehealth, 316 P.3d 1035,
1039 (Wash. 2014).
94. See, e.g., G & S Invs. v. Belman, 700 P.2d 1358, 1365 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1984)
("The [attorney-client] privilege does not apply where one consults an attorney not as a
lawyer but as a friend or business advisor.").
95. Adair v. EQT Prod. Co., 285 F.R.D. 376, 380 (W.D. Va. 2012) (applying
Virginia law); Costco Wholesale Corp. v. Super. Ct., 219 P.3d 736, 743 (Cal. 2009);
Gillard v. AIG Ins. Co., 15 A.3d 44, 78 n.8 (Pa. 2011).
96. Cormack v. United States, 118 Fed. Cl. 39, 43 n.3 (Fed. Cl. 2014); People v.
Curren, 348 P.3d 467, 480 (Colo. Ct. App. 2014).
97. See Am. Zurich Ins. Co. v. Mont. Thirteenth Judicial Dist. Ct., 280 P.3d 240,
245 (Mont. 2012) ("Disclosure to third parties waives [the] attorney-client privilege
unless disclosure is necessary for the client to obtain informed legal advice."); O'Boyle v.
Borough of Longport, 94 A.3d 299, 309 (N.J. 2014) (stating that if "the third party is a
person to whom disclosure of confidential attorney-client communications is necessary to
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generally is borne by the party seeking to overcome the privilege,98
although some courts hold that the party asserting the privilege bears the
burden of establishing that it has not been waived.99
Although a lawyer is presumed to have authority to waive the
privilege on a client's behalf, and many waiver cases pivot on a lawyer's
conduct, only the client may waive the privilege. 00 Again, the privilege
belongs to the client. A lawyer may not waive the privilege over a
client's objection.o'0 And, if a client has knowingly waived the privilege
regarding a particular communication, a lawyer cannot later claim that
the privilege applies to the disclosed information and attempt to withhold
it on that basis.10 2
III. THE AT-ISsuE EXCEPTION TESTS
As previously noted, the attorney-client privilege may be lost in
various ways-and it may be lost with frightening ease as a result of the
at-issue exception. Courts analyzing the possible application of the at-
issue exception typically apply one of three tests derived from federal
case law. The cases articulating those tests are Hearn v. Rhay,'0 3 In re
County of Erie,' 0 and Rhone-Poulenc Rorer Inc. v. Home Indemnity
advance the representation," there is no resulting waiver); Zink v. City of Mesa, 256 P.3d
384, 403 (Wash. Ct. App. 2011) (noting that there is no waiver where the third party is
necessary for the communication). It is worth remembering that a client does not waive
the attorney-client privilege merely by acknowledging that she received legal advice.
Rather, a client waives the privilege only by disclosing the substance of her confidential
communications with her lawyer. Md. Bd. of Physicians v. Geier, 123 A.3d 601, 625
n.26 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2015).
98. Wesp v. Everson, 33 P.3d 191, 198 (Colo. 2001); Yocabet v. UPMC
Presbyterian, 113 A.3d 1012, 1019 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2015); Andrews v. Ridco, Inc., 863
N.W.2d 540, 547 (S.D. 2015); McAfee v. State, 467 S.W.3d 622, 643 (Tex. App. 2015);
State ex rel. Med. Assur. of W. Va., Inc. v. Recht, 583 S.E.2d 80, 89 (W. Va. 2003).
99. See, e.g., United States v. Bolander, 722 F.3d 199, 222 (4th Cir. 2013); In re
Asia Global Crossing, Ltd., 322 B.R. 247, 255 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2005); In re Grand Jury
Investig., 902 N.E.2d 929, 932 (Mass. 2009); Walton v. Mid-Atlantic Spine Specialists,
P.C., 694 S.E.2d 545, 549 (Va. 2010).
100. People v. Delgadillo, 275 P.3d 772, 776 (Colo. Ct. App. 2012); Ctr. Partners,
Ltd. v. Growth Head GP, LLC, 981 N.E.2d 345, 356 (Ill. 2012); Girl Scouts-W. Okla.,
Inc. v. Barringer-Thomson, 252 P.3d 844, 847 (Okla. 2011).
101. Ctr. Partners, Ltd., 981 N.E.2d at 356.
102. San Francisco Residence Club, Inc. v. Baswell-Guthrie, 897 F. Supp. 2d 1122,
1214-16 (N.D. Ala. 2012) (involving the client's former attorney); Sorenson v. Riffo,
No. 2:06-CV-749 TS, 2008 WL 2465454, at *3 (D. Utah June 16, 2008).
103. 68 F.R.D. 574 (E.D. Wash. 1975).
104. 546 F.3d 222 (2d Cir. 2008).
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Co. 05  Regardless of the test selected, application of the at-issue
exception always requires fact-specific inquiry.106
A. The Hearn Test
The most liberal test for fashioning an at-issue exception to the
privilege is derived from a 1975 decision, Hearn v. Rhay.10 7  The
plaintiff, James Hearn, was an inmate at the Washington State
Penitentiary. os He sued prison officials for violating his right to due
process and his Eighth Amendment right against cruel and unusual
punishment by confining him in the prison's mental health unit without
the benefit of a hearing or other administrative review.09 The defendants
denied Hearn's allegations and asserted several affirmative defenses,
including the defense that they acted in good faith and were therefore
immune from suit.110 To overcome this defense, Hearn sought to
discover advice regarding his confinement that the defendants had
received from the Washington attorney general."' In response, the
defendants asserted the attorney-client privilege, and refused to produce
relevant documents or answer related deposition questions.112
Hearn then moved to enforce discovery. . He argued that by
asserting their good faith immunity affirmative defense, the defendants
had "ipso facto waived" their attorney-client privilege.1 13 He analogized
this case to cases in which a plaintiff waives the physician-patient
privilege by filing a suit that puts his physical condition in
controversy.114 More persuasively, he compared his situation to habeas
corpus cases holding that a petitioner impliedly waives the attorney-
client privilege by challenging the constitutionality of his state court
conviction."' Courts find an implied waiver in those cases "in order to
allow inquiry of the petitioner's attorney concerning deliberate bypass of
the right alleged to have been violated, the basis of the waiver being that
privileged communications were the sole source of evidence" on that
issue.'16
105. 32 F.3d 851 (3d Cir. 1994).
106. Alaska Elec. Pension Fund v. Brown, 988 A.2d 412, 419 (Del. 2010).
107. Hearn, 68 F.R.D. at 574.
108. Id at 576.
109. Id. at 577.
110. Id at 577-78.
111. Id. at 577-78.
112. Id at 577.
113. Id. at 580.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 581.
116. Id.
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The court observed that the cases to which Hearn analogized and
others in which a party was held to have impliedly waived the attorney-
client privilege had a common core: the party asserting the privilege
placed otherwise privileged information at issue through an affirmative
act for its own benefit, and to prevent discovery of that information on
privilege grounds would have been "manifestly unfair to the opposing
party."'17  The court then summarized the factors common to each
exception to the privilege as follows:
(1) assertion of the privilege was a result of some affirmative act,
such as filing suit, by the asserting party; (2) through this affirmative
act, the asserting party put the protected information at issue by
making it relevant to the case; and (3) application of the privilege
would have denied the opposing party access to information vital to
his defense.118
Where these three conditions are satisfied, the Hearn court
reasoned, the party asserting the attorney-client privilege should be held
to have waived it through its own affirmative conduct.11 9
Although the cases to which Hearn and the court analogized were
distinguishable because there the parties putting the privilege at issue had
initiated the litigation, that distinction was inconsequential.12 0 All of the
elements common to a finding of waiver were present, as the court
explained:
[The] defendants invoked the privilege in furtherance of an
affirmative defense they asserted for their own benefit; through this
affirmative act they placed the protected information at issue, for the
legal advice they received is germane to the qualified immunity
defense they raised; and one result of asserting the privilege has been
to deprive plaintiff of information necessary to "defend" against
defendants' affirmative defense, for the protected information is also
germane to plaintiffs burden of proving malice or unreasonable
disregard of his clearly established constitutional rights. Since all the
elements of an implied waiver exist, defendants must be found to
have waived their right to assert the attomey-client privilege by virtue
of having raised the affirmative defense of immunity.121
117. Hearn, 68 F.R.D. at 581.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. See id. (noting that the defendants asserted the attorney-client privilege in
connection with an affirmative defense).
121. Id (footnote omitted).
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Finally, it was impossible to reconcile the defendants' assertion of
the attorney-client privilege with the purpose behind it. 122 While in most
cases attorney-client communications are incidental to the litigation and
other means of proof are normally available, here the defendants'
communications with the attorney general's office were inseparably
blended with the elements of Hearn's case and the defendants'
immunity.123  To deny Hearn access to these communications would
prevent "a fair and just determination of the issues. To allow assertion of
the privilege in this manner would pervert its essential purpose and
transform it into a potential tool for concealment of unconstitutional
conduct behind a veil of confidentiality."l 2 4 In this instance, the benefit
to be gained from the disclosure of the defendants' privileged
communications substantially outweighed any resulting harm to the
attorney-client relationship.12 5
In conclusion, the Hearn court found that the defendants' assertion
of their qualified immunity affirmative defense impliedly waived their
attorney-client privilege with respect to any legal advice or confidential
communications with the Washington attorney general regarding their
malice toward Hearn or their knowledge of his constitutional rights.126
The court further found that due to the nature of Hearn's lawsuit, which
put squarely at issue the legal advice the defendants received, the policy
behind the privilege was outweighed by the need for disclosure and the
privilege therefore did not apply.12 7  The court accordingly granted
Hearn's motion to enforce discovery.'28
Although the Hearn test has been widely adopted,129 courts have
criticized it for its confusing and inconsistent application, and for




126. Id. at 583.
127. Hearn, 68 F.R.D. at 583.
128. Id.
129. See, e.g., Seneca Ins. Co. v. W. Claims, Inc., 774 F.3d 1272, 1276 (10th Cir.
2014) (predicting Oklahoma law); Lillieroos v. Starr Indem. & Liab. Co., No. CIV-12-
1359-D, 2016 WL 502074, at *1-2 (W.D. Okla. Feb. 8, 2016) (finding no waiver under
Hearn); DeWitt v. Sw. Bell Tel. Co., No. 12-2605-SAC, 2014 WL 695744, at *5 (D.
Kan. Feb. 24, 2014) (discussing Tenth Circuit and Kansas law); IntegraMed Am., Inc. v.
Patton, 298 F.R.D. 326, 329 (D.S.C. 2014) (calling Hearn "the leading case on the 'at
issue' waiver doctrine"); Billings v. Stonewall Jackson Hosp., 635 F. Supp. 2d 442, 446
(W.D. Va. 2009) (reasoning that Hearn creates a "narrow" exception to the attorney-
client privilege); Lee v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 249 F.R.D. 662, 682-83 (D.
Colo. 2008) (applying Colorado law); Union Cty. v. Piper Jaffray & Co., 248 F.R.D. 217,
222 (S.D. Iowa 2008) ("While critics of the Hearn approach argue that it is . .. a slippery
slope, over three decades of case law make clear that such concerns are without
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yielding unstable results.13 0  Because attorney-client privileged
communications are potentially relevant in any case, the second element
of the Hearn test is dangerously broad, and the entire test is flawed
because nowhere does it require a party to rely on privileged advice to
accomplish a waiver.131 Courts have also criticized the test for
potentially chilling attorney-client communications, for increasing
litigation costs through discovery disputes, and as tending to favor
wealthier litigants.132 For these reasons, the Hearn test has lost favor
with courts.13' Nevertheless, some courts continue to apply it, 134
sometimes tweaking it to alleviate concerns about its utility. In
Anchondo v. Anderson, Crenshaw & Associates, L.L.C.,13 for example,
the court cautiously adopted the Hearn test with the qualification that the
third element-that is, upholding the privilege would deny , the
substantial foundation. The reasonableness of the Hearn approach is particularly evident
where, as here, a defendant has no alternative means of defending a claim brought by the
party asserting the privilege."); UUSI, LLC v. United States, 121 Fed. Cl. 218, 225 (Fed.
Cl. 2015) (quoting Hearn); Gefre v. Davis Wright Tremaine, LLP, 306 P.3d 1264, 1280
(Alaska 2013) (footnote omitted) ("Because we continue to believe fairness to the
opposing party should be included in the implied waiver analysis, we adopt the Hearn
test."); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Lee, 13 P.3d 1169, 1174 (Ariz. 2000) (noting
Arizona courts' adoption of the Hearn test); In re Marriage of Perry, 293 P.3d 170, 179
(Mont. 2013) (reciting the Hearn test from a Montana federal case); Dana v. Piper, 295
P.3d 305, 312-13 (Wash. Ct. App. 2013) (applying the Hearn test).
130. Pub. Serv. Co. of N.M. v. Lyons, 10 P.3d 166, 172-74 (N.M. Ct. App. 2000).
131. In re Cty. of Erie, 546 F.3d 222, 229 (2d Cir. 2008).
132. Mortg. Guar. & Title Co. v. Cunha, 745 A.2d 156, 159 (R.I. 2000).
133. See, e.g., Bacchi v. Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 110 F. Supp. 3d 270, 275-76 (D.
Mass. 2015) (rejecting the Hearn test in favor of the approach announced in In re County
of Erie, 546 F.3d 222 (2d Cir. 2008)); Ariz. Dream Act Coal. v. Brewer, No. CV-12-
02546-PHX-DGC, 2014 WL 171923, at *6 (D. Ariz. Jan. 15, 2014) (favoring the test
announced in Rhone-Poulenc Rorer Inc. v. Home Indemnity Co., 32 F.3d 851 (3d Cir.
1994), over the Hearn test); Elat v. Emandopngoubene, No. PWG-11-2931, 2013 WL
1146205, at *4-6 (D. Md. Mar. 18, 2013) (rejecting the Hearn approach in favor of the
test announced in Rhone-Poulenc); Trs. of Elec. Workers Local No. 26 Pension Tr. Fund
v. Tr. Fund Advisors, Inc., 266 F.R.D. 1, 10-11 (D.D.C. 2010) (rejecting the Hearn test
based on criticisms expressed in In re County of Erie and Rhone-Poulenc); Wardleigh v.
Second Judicial Dist. Ct., 891 P.2d 1180, 1187 (Nev. 1995) (rejecting the Hearn test in
favor of the Rhone-Poulenc test, which the court described as the "anticipatory waiver
theory"); Bertelsen v. Allstate Ins. Co., 796 N.W.2d 685, 703 (S.D. 2011) (supplementing
the Hearn test with a reliance element because "[a]pplication f the Hearn test alone
provides insufficient guidance to be just and workable").
134. See, e.g., 01 Communique Lab., Inc. v. Citrix Sys., Inc., No. 1:06-cv-253, 2016
WL 111443, at *4-5 (N.D. Ohio Jan. 10, 2016) (agreeing with the magistrate judge that
there was no waiver under Hearn in part because the requesting party had received
adequate non-privileged information concerning the license in dispute).
135. 256 F.R.D. 661 (D.N.M. 2009).
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discovering party vital information-be understood to require that the
information sought be available from no other source.136
B. The County of Erie Test
Again, a fundamental criticism of the Hearn test is that it does not
require the party losing the privilege to have relied on its lawyer's advice
in order to put the advice at issue.'3 7 The Second Circuit remedied this
perceived deficiency in formulating a new test for the at-issue exception
in In re County ofErie.138
The County of Erie plaintiffs alleged that the Erie County, New
York sheriffs policy requiring all detainees entering Erie County
detention facilities to be strip searched violated the Fourth
Amendment.13 9 The plaintiffs sued the county, the sheriff, and other
senior law enforcement officials under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.140 The
plaintiffs sought the production of ten e-mail messages reflecting
communications between members of the sheriffs office and lawyers in
the office of the Erie County attorney.14 1 In these messages the county
attorney's office reviewed the law on detainee strip searches, evaluated
the county's strip search policy, recommended alternative policies, and
tracked the implementation of policy revisions.142  The defendants
withheld the e-mails on attorney-client privilege grounds, but the district
court determined that they had impliedly waived the privilege by putting
the contents of those messages at issue in asserting a qualified immunity
defense.14 3 In so holding, the district court relied on the Hearn test. 4
In its analysis, the district court focused on the deposition testimony
of two individual defendants.14 5 The first was Donald Livingston, who
was a supervisor at the county jail.1 46  When questioned regarding a
memorandum he prepared directing jail staff to stop routinely strip
searching new inmates, Livingston testified that there were ongoing
136. Id. at 670-71 (quoting Frontier Ref. Inc. v. Gorman-Rupp Co., 136 F.3d 695,
701 (10th Cir. 1998)).
137. See Bertelsen, 796 N.W.2d at 703 (criticizing the Hearn approach and stating
that in applying the at-issue exception, "[t]he key factor is reliance of the client upon the
advice of his attorney").
138. 546 F.3d 222 (2d Cir. 2008).
139. Id. at 224.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 225 (quoting In re Cty. of Erie, 473 F.3d 413, 416 (2d Cir: 2007)).
143. Id. at 226.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 226-27.
146. Id. at 226.
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discussions with lawyers in the county attorney's office regarding
changes in the relevant law.14 7 Defense counsel then objected and halted
any further questioning regarding legal advice the defendants had
received.14 8  The second defendant was McCarthy Gipson, a jail
employee who signed the memorandum that Livingston prepared.14 9
Gipson testified that the county attorney's office participated in rewriting
the strip search policy. 50
Acting on the defendants' petition for a writ of mandamus, the
Second Circuit noted that while it had previously cited Hearn for some
general propositions, it had never decided whether the Hearn test was
definitive in its entirety.15' The court observed that courts in its circuit
and elsewhere had criticized the Hearn test and applied it unevenly, and
that the Hearn test was also the subject of academic criticism.15 2 In light
of these facts, the County of Erie court saw a need to clarify "the scope
of the at-issue waiver and the circumstances under which it should be
applied."'5 3
The Second Circuit agreed with critics' contention that the Hearn
test is too broad and concluded that the district court erred in applying
it.154 As the court explained:
According to Hearn, an assertion of privilege by one who pleads a
claim or affirmative defense "put[s] the protected information at issue
by making it relevant to the case." . . . But privileged information
may be in some sense relevant in any lawsuit. A mere indication of a
claim or defense certainly is insufficient to place legal advice at issue.
The Hearn test presumes that the information is relevant and should
be disclosed and would open a great number of privileged
communications to claims of at-issue waiver. Nowhere in the Hearn
test is found the essential element of reliance on privileged advice in
the assertion of the claim or defense in order to effect a waiver.
The court therefore held that "a party must rely on privileged advice
from his counsel to make his claim or defense" to put that advice at
issue.15 6 That was not the situation here. The defendants did not put the
county attorney's advice at issue by asserting qualified immunity as a
147. Id.
148. Cty. ofErie, 546 F.3d at 226.
149. Id at 227.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 227-28.
153. Id at 228.
154. Id.at229.
155. Id. (citation omitted).
156. Id.
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defense because qualified immunity shields government officials from
civil liability for "damages as long as their conduct does not violate
clearly established constitutional or statutory rights of which a
reasonable person would have known."157 Whether rights are "clearly
established" in this context is determined by reference to case law
existing at time of the alleged offense."' Because this is an objective
standard, reliance on advice of counsel cannot be invoked to support a
qualified immunity defense.15 9
The court further explained that defendants had not asserted "a good
faith or state of mind defense," but had contended only that their actions
were lawful or, alternatively, that the plaintiffs' claimed rights were not
clearly established.160 Thus, any legal advice the county attorney's office
gave them was irrelevant to any defense they raised.16 1 Protecting the e-
mail messages as privileged was not unfair to the plaintiffs because they
were "'in no way worse off' as a result of the disclosure that
communications exist than they would be if they were unaware of
them." 16 2 Finally, withholding the e-mails as privileged would not deny
the plaintiffs access to information vital to their claims.16 3
After concluding that Livingston's and Gipson's deposition
testimony had not waived the defendants' attorney-client privilege, the
County of Erie court granted the defendants' petition for mandamus and
directed the district court to enter an order protecting the confidentiality
of the disputed e-mail messages.164  In closing, the Second Circuit
reminded the parties that the plaintiffs could reargue the applicability of
the privilege in the district court should the defendants attempt to assert
advice of counsel or their good faith as defenses at trial.165
Returning now to the reliance element in the interest of fleshing it
out, under County of Erie, it is not necessary for purposes of establishing
reliance to show that the party intends to introduce or use evidence of
otherwise privileged attorney-client communications at trial. 16 6 Rather,
157. Id. (quoting Gilles v. Repicky, 511 F.3d 239, 243 (2d Cir. 2007) (internal
quotation marks omitted)).





162. Id. (quoting John Doe Co. v. United States, 350 F.3d 299, 305 (2d Cir. 2003)).
163. Id. (quoting Pritchard v. City of Erie, No. 04-CV-00534C, 2007 WL 3232096,
at *2 (W.D.N.Y. Oct. 31, 2007) (citing Hearn v. Rhay 68 F.R.D. 574, 581 (E.D. Wash.
1975)), vacated by In re Cty. of Erie, 546 F.3d 222 (2d Cir. 2008)).
164. Id. at 230.
165. Id.
166. Bacchi v. Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 110 F. Supp. 3d 270, 276 (D. Mass. 2015).
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the at-issue exception is triggered if the party's claim or defense "relies
on certain facts that can only be tested or rebutted if the adversary is
given access to the privileged material."l6 7 For example, if the
defendants in County ofErie had defended based on their own subjective
good faith belief that the strip search policy was legal, then the reliance
element would likely be met even if they disclaimed any intent to offer
evidence of advice from the county attorney's office.16 8
C. The Rhone-Poulenc Test
The third test, which is most protective of the attorney-client
privilege, comes from the Third Circuit's decision in Rhone-Poulenc
Rorer Inc. v. Home Indemnity Co.16 9 In that case, over 200 plaintiffs
sued Armour, a pharmaceutical company that Rhone-Poulenc had
acquired, alleging that Armour's blood clotting drug, Factorate, had
infected them with HIV.1 70 Rhone-Poulenc sought coverage for these
lawsuits from its primary liability insurer, Home Indemnity Co., and its
excess liability insurer, Pacific Employers Insurance Co.171  Home
denied coverage and Rhone-Poulenc filed a declaratory judgment action
alleging that Home did, in fact, owe coverage for the AIDS-related
suits.17 2 Home brought Pacific Employers into the declaratory judgment
action by way of a third-party complaint.73
Home and Pacific Employers contended that Rhone-Poulenc knew
of Factorate's alleged transmission of HIV when it purchased the
insurance policies, meaning that here were no "occurrences" under the
policies and thus there was no coverage.74 Similarly, the insurers
asserted that Rhone-Poulenc and Armour had wrongfully obtained
coverage by concealing their knowledge of the potential for AIDS-
related claims resulting from the use of Factorate.175 Finally, Home and
Pacific Employers alleged that Armour sold Factorate knowing that it
posed an unreasonable risk of harm to its users, and therefore any
resulting claims were uninsurable.17 6
167. Id. (citing Cty. ofErie, 546 F.3d at 229).
168. Cty. ofErie, 546 F.3d at 228-29; Bacchi, 110 F. Supp. 3d at 276.
169. 32 F.3d 851 (3d Cir. 1994).




174. Id at 855-56.
175. Id. at 856.
176. Id.
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In an effort to establish these defenses, Home and Pacific
Employers deposed Robert E. Cawthorn, Rhone-Poulenc's chairman and
CEO. 1 77 He testified about Rhone-Poulenc's due diligence in deciding to
acquire Armour.178  He testified that while Rhone-Poulenc was
negotiating Armour's purchase, he and others at Rhone-Poulenc were
aware of press reports discussing the transmission of the AIDS virus
through blood products, and had sought legal advice regarding associated
potential liabilities.1 79 Cawthon recalled:
We had got the advice of outside counsel on the potential legal
liabilities in this area and had learned that blood products are not
considered in most states as products, per se, and are not subject to
the same liability laws as regular pharmaceutical products. We had
learned that there was some precedence [sic] in terms of transmission
of the hepatitis virus which these plasma products had transmitted to
hemophiliacs. And that, in fact, my recollection is we were told that
there had been no successful cases against the fractionaters [sic] and
hepatitis because of the particular legal situation. And the opinion
was that that should hold, also, for the AIDS virus.so
Home and Pacific Employers subsequently moved to compel
Rhone-Poulenc to produce all evaluations of its potential AIDS-related
liability, including any documents reflecting the advice Cawthorn
described.'8 When Rhone-Poulenc produced some documents but not
all the documents they wanted, the insurers pressed their motion to
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. Rhone-Poulenc, 32 F.3d at 856. Although apparently not a concern with respect
to Cawthon's deposition in Rhone-Poulenc, baiting a deponent into saying he relied on
the advice of counsel does not put that advice at issue. See, e.g., Synygy, Inc. v. ZS
Assocs., Inc., No. 07-3536, 2013 WL 3914483, at *2-3 (E.D. Pa. July 29, 2013) (denying
the defendants' motion to compel on the basis that the plaintiff had not waived the
attorney-client privilege by relying on advice of counsel); N.J. v. Sprint Corp., 258 F.R.D.
421, 432 (D. Kan. 2009) ("[T]he Sprint defendants have not impliedly waived the
attorney-client privilege by placing advice of counsel at issue through the above-cited
deposition testimony. . . . [T]he testimony was elicited by the lead plaintiff's counsel
during the depositions. Although the questions may not have been as clearly directed at
eliciting privileged information as those in [an earlier case], the Sprint defendants did not
voluntarily raise their reliance on advice of counsel."); In re Truscott, No. A15-1767,
2016 WL 2946218, at *9 (Minn. Ct. App. May 23, 2016) ("Truscott was compelled in a
deposition-in a case in which she is a defendant-to answer respondents' questions as
to whether she relied on the advice of her counsel. She gave one-word responses to the
questions. These compelled responses are not affirmative steps taken by a client to place
privileged communications 'at issue."').
180. Rhone-Poulenc, 32 F.3d at 856.
181. Id.
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compel.'82 The insurers argued that by filing the declaratory judgment
action and putting its lawyers' advice at issue, Rhone-Poulenc waived
any right to resist the disclosure of the requested documents on attorney-
client privilege grounds.183 The magistrate judge on the case sided with
the insurers, as did the district judge.184 The district judge wrote:
In accordance with [the magistrate judge's] findings, this court
adjudges the subpoenas to pertain to directly relevant information. At
issue is [Rhone-Poulenc's] knowledge of the liabilities associated
with the acquisition of Armour. The issues put into question by this
lawsuit focus around [Rhone-Poulenc's] knowledge of the underlying
claims and when they became aware of such claims. This court finds
that the documents The Home and PEIC seek will aide in disclosing
what and when [Rhone-Poulenc] knew of the underlying claims.
Thus, the information contained in the requested documents is
directly relevant. Therefore, in this instance this court finds it
necessary to invade the attorney-client privilege.185
After the district court denied its motion for reconsideration, Rhone-
Poulenc appealed to the Third Circuit.18 6
The Rhone-Poulenc ourt observed that because the attorney-client
privilege serves the interests of justice, it deserves "maximum legal
protection."187  Furthermore, courts must apply the privilege certainly
and predictably, because an uncertain privilege is little better than no
privilege at all.188 Although there was authority holding that a party can
waive its attorney-client privilege by putting its lawyer's advice at issue,
the court noted that in such cases the client "made the decision and taken
the affirmative step" to put its lawyer's advice at issue.189 Abrogating
the attorney-client privilege in that instance is consistent with basic
privilege doctrine.'90 That is, by allowing the client to decide whether to
waive the privilege by placing her lawyer's advice at issue, a court (1)
provides certainty by ensuring that the client's confidential
communications will stay private unless she affirmatively surrenders the
privilege, and (2) furnishes predictability around the circumstances in
182. Id. at 856-57.
183. Id. at 857.
184. Id at 858-60.
185. Id. at 859.
186. Id. at 860 (explaining that Rhone-Poulenc petitioned for a writ of mandamus
and filed a notice of appeal).
187. Id. at 862 (citing Haines v. Liggett Group, Inc., 975 F.2d 81, 90 (3d Cir. 1992)).
188. Id. at 863 (quoting In re von Bulow, 828 F.2d 94, 100 (2d Cir. 1987)).
189. Id
190. Rhone-Poulenc, 32 F.3d at 863.
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which the client may lose the privilege. 9 ' This stability allows clients to
consult with their lawyers "free from the apprehension that the
communications will be disclosed without their consent."'92
Citing Hearn v. Rhay'93 and another district court case, Byers v.
Burleson,'94 the Rhone-Poulenc court observed that some courts had
enlarged the at-issue exception to permit the disclosure of privileged
communications where the client's state of mind was at issue in the
litigation.1 9 5 But the Third Circuit considered these decisions to be "of
dubious validity" 96 because:
While the opinions dress up their analysis with a checklist of factors,
they appear to rest on a conclusion that the information sought is
relevant and should in fairness be disclosed. Relevance is not the
standard for determining whether or not evidence should be protected
from disclosure as privileged, and that remains the case even if one
might conclude the facts to be disclosed are vital, highly probative,
directly relevant or even go to the heart of an issue.197
Penetrating the privilege based on the relevance of a communication
would erode clients' expectation of confidentiality in dealings with their
lawyers, thereby subverting a central purpose of the privilege.198 Clients
would further risk the loss of confidentiality in relation to their most
important affairs.'99 Finally, because any relevance determination will
likely depend on the facts and circumstances of unknown future
litigation, the client can never be confident that its communications with
- * 200its lawyer will remain private.
The Rhone-Poulenc ourt reasoned that a party does not lose her
attorney-client privilege when her state of mind is at issue in a case.201
Even if her lawyer's advice may be relevant, the interests the attorney-
client privilege is intended to protect remain "served by
confidentiality."202
Here, the sole matter at issue was whether Rhone-Poulenc knew that
Factorate was transmitting HIV before it obtained liability insurance
191. Id.
192. Id. at 863-64.
193. 68 F.R.D. 574 (E.D. Wash. 1975).
194. 100 F.R.D. 436 (D.D.C. 1983).
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from Home and Pacific Employers.203 The court concluded that Rhone-
Poulenc had not waived its attorney-client privilege by filing the
declaratory judgment action or by putting its state of mind at issue.204
Because Rhone-Poulenc had "not interjected the advice of counsel as an
essential element of a claim in [the] case," the district court erred in
affirming the magistrate judge's decision and in ordering Rhone-Poulenc
to produce the disputed documents.205
In summary, for the at-issue exception to apply under Rhone-
Poulenc, a party must (1) assert a claim or defense, and (2) attempt to
establish that claim or defense by describing or disclosing an otherwise
privileged attorney-client communication.2 06 It is not enough that a party
may have been influenced by communications with her lawyer and thus
that the lawyer's advice is relevant to the party's state of mind; rather,
the party triggers the at-issue exception only by affirmatively using the
lawyer's advice to establish a claim or defense.20 7 Finally, however strict
or protective the Rhone-Poulenc test may be, it is still fair to all
concerned because it prevents a litigant "from asserting advice of counsel
only to its benefit, thereby eliminating the risk that a party will attempt to
use the advice-of-counsel as both a sword and a shield."208
D. Summary and Synthesis
The attorney-client privilege is a critically important doctrine that
serves the interests of justice, and the confidentiality it provides deserves
maximum protection.2 09 Exceptions to the privilege should, therefore, be
203. Id.
204. Id.
205. Rhone-Poulenc, 32 F.3d at 864 (citing Remington Arms Co. v. Liberty Mut. Ins.
Co., 142 F.R.D. 408 (D. Del. 1992)).
206. See, e.g., Piazza v. Cty. of Luzeme, No. 3:13-CV-1755, 2015 WL 6690090, at
*3-4 (M.D. Pa. Oct. 30, 2015) (finding that the Rhone-Poulenc two step inquiry was
satisfied and that the defendants had placed their counsel's advice at issue); Nesselrotte v.
Allegheny Energy Inc., No. 06-01390, 2008 WL 2858401, at *6-7 (W.D. Pa. July 22,
2008) (applying this "two step inquiry").
207. See, e.g., DR Distribs., LLC v. 21 Century Smoking, Inc., No. 12 CV 50324,
2015 WL 5123652, at *7 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 1, 2015) ("Here . . . the plaintiff is using only
the fact that he consulted with counsel to establish his good faith defense rather than the
content of the advice received. . . . Accordingly, the plaintiffs are walking the fine line of
privilege without crossing over the line into waiver.") (citation omitted).
208. Elat v. Emandopngoubene, No. PWG-11-2931, 2013 WL 1146205, at *6 (D.
Md. Mar. 18, 2013).
209. Rhone-Poulenc, 32 F.3d at 862.
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carefully crafted.210  Any related test should provide certain and
predictable results.
Of the three tests for determining whether a party's privileged
communications have been placed at issue, the Hearn test is "the most
widely accepted."211 Again, under Hearn, the at-issue exception applies
when (1) assertion of the privilege was a result of some affirmative act
by the asserting party, such as filing suit; (2) by so acting, the party
placed the privileged communication at issue by making it relevant to the
case; and (3) enforcing the privilege would deny the opposing party
212information vital to its claim or defense. But while the Hearn test may
be popular, it is unsatisfactory for several reasons.
First, courts generally agree that a party does not place its lawyer's
advice at issue simply by filing suit.2 13 The first element of the Hearn
test, therefore, contradicts settled law. Second, relevance is not the
standard for deciding whether evidence should be shielded from
disclosure because "privileged information may be in some sense
relevant in any lawsuit."2 14  Furthermore, because the definition of
relevance will depend on the facts and circumstances of unspecified
future litigation, the client cannot judge whether a communication with
her lawyer may be relevant to some future issue, and thus can never be
assured that it will stay confidential.215 Such uncertainty and
unpredictability undermines the purposes behind the privilege.2 16 Third,
whether upholding the privilege will deny an opponent information vital
to its claim or defense should not be a factor because it confuses the
attorney-client privilege with tangible work product immunity. This is a
material error. While a party may discover an opponent's tangible work
product by showing substantial need for the materials and the inability to
obtain their substantial equivalent without undue hardship, attorney-
client communications do not become discoverable by virtue of the
210. See In re Cty. of Erie, 546 F.3d 222, 228 (2d Cir. 2008) (reasoning that "rules
which result in waiver of this privilege and thus possess the potential to weaken attorney-
client trust, should be formulated with caution").
211. Botkin v. Donegal Mut. Ins. Co., No. 5:10cv00077, 2011 WL 2447939, at *4
(W.D. Va. June 15, 2011) (citing Metric Constructors, Inc. v. Bank of Tokyo-Mitsubishi,
LTD., No. 5:97-CV-369BR1, 1998 WL 1742589, at *6 n.6 (E.D.N.C. Sept. 28, 1998);
City of Myrtle Beach v. United Nat'l Ins. Co., No. 4:08-1183-TLW-SVH, 2010 WL
3420044 (D.S.C. Aug. 27, 2010).
212. Hearn v. Rhay, 68 F.R.D. 574, 581 (E.D. Wash. 1975).
213. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
214. In re Cty. of Erie, 546 F.3d at 229.
215. Rhone-Poulenc Rorer Inc. v. Home Indem. Co., 32 F.3d 851, 864 (3d Cir.
1994).
216. Id.
217. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3).
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requesting party's inability to obtain the information from other
sources.2 18  Privileged information is simply not subject to discovery
219based on another party's substantial need or undue hardship.
The County of Erie test represents an improvement over the Hearn
test because it diminishes the relevance element220 and adds a reliance
element.221 The County of Erie test is still flawed, however, because it
leaves intact the third element of the Hearn test-that is, upholding the
privilege would deny the discovering party information vital to its claim
or defense.222
The problems with the Hearn and County of Erie tests, plus other
considerations, lead to the conclusion that the Rhone-Poulenc test
supplies the proper standard for determining whether a party has placed
its lawyer's advice at issue. Courts that have not already selected a test
or that are not required to apply a test favored by a superior court should
adopt the Rhone-Poulenc test. Courts that have adopted a different test
should reconsider. Again, the Rhone-Poulenc test holds that "[t]he
advice of counsel is placed in issue where the client asserts a claim or
defense, and attempts to prove that claim or defense by disclosing or
describing an attorney-client communication."223
The Rhone-Poulenc test is superior first because it adheres to the
principle that the attorney-client privilege is a shield, not a sword.224
Second, by leaving to the client the decision whether to surrender the
privilege by placing its lawyer's advice at issue, the test provides
certainty, consistency, and predictability as to any possible application of
218. Collins v. Braden, 384 S.W.3d 154, 159 (Ky. 2012) (citing St. Luke Hosps., Inc.
v. Kopowski, 160 S.W.3d 771, 777 (Ky. 2005)).
219. See United States v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 132 F. Supp. 3d 558, 563
(S.D.N.Y. 2015) (stating that the attorney-client privilege cannot be overcome by a
showing of sufficient need); Hagans v. Gatorland Kubota, LLC/Sentry Ins., 45 So. 3d 73,
76 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2010) ("The attorney-client privilege is not subject to any
balancing test and, unlike matters protected by work-product privilege, cannot be
discovered by a showing of need, undue hardship, or some other competing interest.");
Collins, 384 S.W.3d at 159 (referring to "great need and hardship").
220. See In re Cty. of Erie, 546 F.3d 222, 229 (2d Cir. 2008) ("But privileged
information may be in some sense relevant in any lawsuit. A mere indication of a claim
or defense certainly is insufficient to place legal advice at issue.").
221. See id. (holding that a party must rely on privileged advice from its lawyer to
make its claim or defense).
222. See id (explaining that in upholding the privilege, the court was not denying the
plaintiffs information vital to their claims).
223. Rhone-Poulenc Rorer Inc. v. Home Indem. Co., 32 F.3d 851, 863 (3d Cir.
1994).
224. Elat v. Emandopngoubene, No. PWG-1 1-2931, 2013 WL 1146205, at *6 (D.
Md. Mar. 18, 2013); Pub. Serv. Co. of N.M. v. Lyons, 10 P.3d 166, 174 (N.M. Ct. App.
2000).
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the at-issue exception and the circumstances in which the privilege may
be lost.2 25  For this reason, the Rhone-Poulenc test also honors the
principle that the client alone-not an adversary-holds and controls the
privilege.2 26  Third, by stabilizing the at-issue exception, the Rhone-
Poulenc test encourages clients to confide in their lawyers without
having to fear that their communications will be disclosed without their
consent.227 In this way the test embraces the basic principle underlying
the attorney-client privilege, which is to encourage full and frank
communications between lawyers and clients, thereby promoting the
broader public interest in fidelity to law and the administration of
justice.228  Fourth, by restricting the at-issue exception to well-defined
circumstances, the Rhone-Poulenc test discourages discovery disputes
and thus reduces litigation costs.22 9 Fifth, this test promotes fundamental
principles of justice by discouraging parties from seeking an unfair
litigation advantage through the attempted discovery of adversaries'
privileged communications.23 0
Once a party places its lawyer's advice at issue under any of the
tests, the focus shifts to the scope of the intrusion into the party's
communications with its lawyer. Generally, the at-issue exception
"extends to all of the communications bearing on the subject matter that
the court deems necessary to litigate the issue fairly." 231 Thus, with
respect to otherwise privileged matters that have been put at issue, the
discovering party will enjoy great range.232 The client's communications
225. Rhone-Poulenc, 32 F.3d at 863.
226. See In re Seagate Tech., LLC, 497 F.3d 1360, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2007) ("The
attorney-client privilege belongs to the client, who alone may waive it.").
227. Rhone-Poulenc, 32 F.3d at 863-64.
228. Pub. Serv. Co. of N.M, 10 P.3d at 174 (quoting Upjohn Co. v. United States,
449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981)).
229. See generally Remington Arms Co. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 142 F.R.D. 408,
413 (D. Del. 1992) (noting the criticism that "extremely liberal waiver rules increase
litigation costs and judicial time spent on discovery disputes"); Wardleigh v. Second
Judicial Dist. Ct., 891 P.2d 1180, 1187 (Nev. 1995) (making the same observation and
citing Remington Arms, among other sources).
230. See, e.g., Synygy, Inc. v. ZS Assocs., Inc., No. 07-3536, 2013 WL 3914483, at
*2-3 (E.D. Pa. July 29, 2013) (relying on Rhone-Poulenc in concluding that a party could
not bait a deponent into waiving the attorney-client privilege by testifying that he had
relied on advice of counsel).
231. DAVID M. GREENWALD ET AL., TESTIMONIAL PRIVILEGES § 1:88, at 351 (2015
ed.) (footnote omitted).
232. See In re Seagate Tech., LLC, 497 F.3d 1360, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2007) ("'The
widely applied standard for determining the scope of a waiver . .. is that the waiver
applies to all other communications relating to the same subject matter.' . . . This broad
scope is grounded in principles of fairness and serves to prevent a party from
simultaneously using the privilege as both a sword and a shield; that is, it prevents the
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with its lawyer about matters that were not placed at issue, however,
remain confidential.233 Moreover, where a client is represented by two
separate lawyers or law firms in a matter, placing one lawyer's or firm's
advice at issue does not necessarily expose the client's communications
with the second lawyer or law firm to discovery.234 From an overall
perspective, then, the scope of the at-issue exception-or the scope of at-
issue waiver in courts that favor waiver terminology-is limited or
narrow.235
Three other points bear mention. One, and as should hopefully be
apparent, the at-issue exception applies only where the legal advice the
client places at issue is that of its own lawyer-that is, the lawyer with
whom it shares an attorney-client relationship.236 Thus, in the rare case
where a party relies on the advice of lawyers other than its own in
pursuing a course of action, it does not rupture the attorney-client
privilege cloaking communications with its own lawyer, even if the other
lawyers' advice or opinions relate to the same subject.2 3 7
Two, even where a party's good faith is a central element of its
claim or defense-a scenario in which the at-issue exception is regularly
inequitable result of a party disclosing favorable communications while asserting the
privilege as to less favorable ones.") (citation omitted).
233. GREENWALD ET AL., supra note 231, § 1:88, at 351-52. See, e.g., Lambright v.
Ryan, 698 F.3d 808, 818 (9th Cir. 2012) (explaining that when a federal habeas petitioner
alleges ineffective assistance of counsel, the implied waiver of his attorney-client
privilege "does not extend beyond the adjudication of the ineffectiveness claim in the
federal habeas proceeding"); CCC Info. Servs., Inc. v. Mitchell Int'l, Inc., No. 03 C 2695,
2006 WL 3486810, at *6 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 1, 2006) (reasoning that because the scope of
waiver is limited to the subject of the legal opinion at issue, and because the information
sought related solely to the issue of potential damages and not to liability, which was the
subject of the advice-of-counsel defense, disclosure was inappropriate); McGuire v. Am.
Family Mut, Ins. Co., No. 08-1072-JTM, 2009 WL 1044945, at *3 (D. Kan. Aug. 3,
2009) (confining examination of the insurer's in-house lawyer to the time preceding the
insurer's termination of the plaintiffs agency; the insurer asserted advice of counsel as a
defense to the plaintiffs wrongful termination claims).
234. See In re Seagate Tech., 497 F.3d at 1374 ("In sum, we hold, as a general
proposition, that asserting the advice of counsel defense and disclosing opinions of
opinion counsel do not constitute waiver of the attorney-client privilege for
communications with trial counsel.") (emphasis added).
235. See, e.g., Lambright, 698 F.3d at 818 (noting that at-issue waiver is "narrow"
and "limited" in ineffective assistance of counsel cases); In re Target Tech. Co., LLC,
208 F. App'x 825, 827 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (stating that the scope of the at-issue waiver in
the case was "necessarily limited"); Simmons, Inc. v. Bombardier, Inc., 221 F.R.D. 4, 10
(D.D.C. 2004) (adopting the "narrow waiver" approach in a patent infringement case);
Clair v. Clair, 982 N.E.2d 32, 43 (Mass. 2013) (quoting Darius v. Boston, 741 N.E.2d 52,
58 (Mass. 2001)).
236. DRFP, LLC v. Republica Bolivariana de Venezuela, No. 2:04-cv-793, 2015 WL
2452970, slip op. at *6 (S.D. Ohio May 22, 2015).
237. Id.
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held to apply by courts relying on the Hearn and County of Erie tests-
its lawyer's involvement in formulating that claim or defense does not
place the lawyer's advice at issue if the thrust of the party's argument is
that its conduct was lawful or was approved by regulators.238 In that
case, the party's argument depends on objective facts rather than its
subjective belief, and its lawyer's advice is therefore irrelevant.23 9 i
short, there is a difference between a claim or defense based on the actual
legality or regulatory approval of a party's conduct, which should not
trigger the at-issue exception, and a party's assertion that it held a good
faith belief that its conduct was lawful or would pass regulatory muster,
which may well put its lawyer's advice at issue depending on the test
employed.240
Finally, the at-issue exception is a common law creation. Most
states have codified the attorney-client privilege to some extent. In some
states that have codified the privilege, courts will not recognize an
exception to the privilege that is not provided by statute.24 1 It is therefore
possible that a court in a state that has not codified the at-issue exception
will decline to recognize it on that basis.242 It is also possible, however,
that even in a state that purports not to recognize exceptions to the
238. See, e.g., Bacchi v. Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 110 F. Supp. 3d 270, 277-78 (D.
Mass. 2015) ("[T]he defendant has not waived any privilege . .. by virtue of asserting the
defenses of good faith and regulatory approval. . . . [Tihe plaintiff does not presently
need to inquire into counsel's advice .. . to interpret the [Department of Insurance's]
guidance ... or to assess whether the defendant had a good faith basis to follow that
guidance. The defendant ... intends to argue, simply, that its actions accorded with the
guidance ... and were consistent with the actions others . .. would take. The plaintiff
does not need to discover counsel's privileged communications to test whether this
defense has any merit; rather, it has been provided with the same DOI information ...
and thus is in a position to test and rebut the defendant's assertions."); Banco Do Brasil,
S.A. v. 275 Wash. St. Corp., No. 09-11343-NMG, 2011 WL 3208027, at *3 (D. Mass.
July 27, 2011) ("Attorney Scott has indicated only that phe and. Bank employees
worked .. . to obtain the approval of regulators. The Bank has not sought to excuse its
performance by claiming it relied on its counsel.. . . The Trust is free to explore the steps
the Bank and its attorney took. What it is not free to do is inquire into confidential
communications between the Bank and its counsel.") (footnote omitted).
239. Bacchi, 110 F. Supp. 3d at 277.
240. See id. at 276-77 (illustrating this distinction).
241. See, e.g., Chubb & Son v. Super. Ct., 176 Cal. Rptr. 3d 389, 396 (Ct. App.
2014) ("Because the attorney-client privilege in California is a product of statute . .. there
are no exceptions to the privilege unless expressly provided by statute.") (citation
omitted).
242. See, e.g., Jackson v. Greger, 854 N.E.2d 487, 491 (Ohio 2006) ("In reaching this
holding [rejecting waiver based on Hearn], we are aware that several Ohio courts of
appeals have applied the Hearn test. We are nevertheless guided by the significant body
of law from this court that has consistently rejected the adoption of judicially created
waivers, exceptions, and limitations for testimonial privilege statutes.") (footnote
omitted).
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privilege beyond those provided by statute, a court might recognize the
at-issue doctrine by characterizing it as a form of waiver.243 It is
additionally possible that a court will conclude that it is free to craft new
exceptions to the privilege beyond those that are statutorily-created
where fairness requires as much on the theory that the statutory
exceptions are not exclusive.24 In summary, a party that wants to argue
that it has not put its lawyer's advice at issue may wish to consider
whether it has a statutory basis for its position, but the likely success of
that argument is difficult to gauge.
IV. AT-ISsuE EXCEPTION TROUBLE SPOTS
In some cases, lawyers should recognize that clients' privileged
communications will be at issue. For example, a party's assertion of an
advice of counsel defense unquestionably places its lawyer's advice at
issue,24 5 as does a party's assertion of a claim that pivots on the advice
24
of, or consultation with, counsel.246 Ineffective assistance of counsel
allegations plainly implicate privileged advice the defendant received
from his lawyer.24 7 In other cases, though, clients and lawyers may stray
243. See, e.g., Wellpoint Health Networks, Inc. v. Super. Ct., 68 Cal. Rptr. 2d 844,
855-56 (Ct. App. 1997) ("The. . . employer's injection into the lawsuit of an issue
concerning the adequacy of the investigation where the investigation was undertaken by
an attorney or law firm must result in waiver of the attorney- client privilege. . . . As our
Supreme Court has held, waiver is established by a showing that 'the client has put the
otherwise privileged communication directly at issue and that disclosure is essential for a
fair adjudication of the action."') (quoting S. Cal. Gas Co. v. Pub. Utils. Comm'n, 784
P.2d 1373, 1378 (Cal. 1990)).
244. S. Cal. Gas Co., 784 P.2d at 1378; Squire, Sanders, & Dempsey, L.L.P. v.
Givaudan Flavors Corp., 937 N.E.2d 533, 538-44 (Ohio 2010).
245. See, e.g., In re Echo Star Commc'n Corp., 448 F.3d 1294, 1299 (Fed. Cir. 2006)
("Once a party announces that i will rely on advice of counsel, for example, in response
to an assertion of willful infringement, the attorney-client privilege is waived.").
246. See, e.g., 3M Co. v. Engle, 328 S.W.3d 184, 189 (Ky. 2010) (reasoning that
because the plaintiffs asserted that their causes of action did not accrue until their
attorney told them of a connection between their respirator equipment and their illnesses,
the nature and timing of their communications with their attorney regarding this
connection became "not only relevant, but in fact critical to the case").
247. See, e.g., Barnes v. Hammer, 765 F.3d 810, 812 n.2 (8th Cir. 2014) (noting that
"because Barnes alleged ineffective assistance of counsel . . . he affirmatively waived his
right to the attorney-client privilege insofar as the conversations related to the specifics of
the plea negotiations, as this was the basis for his ineffective assistance claim");
Lambright v. Ryan, 968 F.3d 808, 818 (9th Cir. 2012) ("The defendant impliedly waives
his attorney-client privilege the moment he files a habeas petition alleging ineffective
assistance of counsel."); Johnson v. State, 860 N.W.2d 913, 921 (Iowa Ct. App. 2014)
(asserting that a criminal defendant waives the attorney-client privilege "when he puts at
issue the effectiveness of counsel"); In re Medina, 475 S.W.3d 291, 302 (Tex. App.
2015) (explaining that "a defendant waives the attorney-client privilege when he argues
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into the at-issue exception without having considered it or recognized its
potential application when evaluating causes of action or deliberating on
strategy. If, for example, a party was advised on a transaction by both an
accountant and a lawyer and later sued the accountant for negligent
advice, in many jurisdictions the party likely placed her lawyer's advice
at issue.2 48 After all, if the lawyer's advice contradicted the accountant's
and the party nevertheless took the accountant's advice, the accountant
may prevail for want of proximate cause.249 Similarly, a party who sues
someone for negligent misrepresentation or fraud arising out of a
transaction in which the party was represented by counsel or consulted
with a lawyer may have put her lawyer's advice at issue because it may
show that her reliance on the defendant's representations was
unreasonable.250
Several situations or types of cases consistently present at-issue
251exception traps. As briefly noted earlier, any case in which a party
asserts its subjective good faith as a basis for a claim or defense is
potentially perilous.252 Other examples include contract disputes where
the parties' intent or the circumstances surrounding formation of the
contract are in dispute, two types of employment litigation, insurance bad
faith litigation, and the use of privileged documents to refresh witnesses'
recollections in preparation for depositions. These are discussed in order
below.
that his sentence should be overturned because his counsel was constitutionally
ineffective").
248. See, e.g., Chin v. Rogoff & Co., No. 05 Civ. 8360(NRB), 2008 WL 2073934, at
*5-6 (S.D.N.Y. May 8, 2008) (following Hearn).
249. Id. at *6.
250. See, e.g., Union Cty. v. Piper Jaffray & Co., 248 F.R.D. 217, 222-25 (S.D. Iowa
2008) (applying the Hearn test in a lawsuit against an investment banking firm arising
out of a bond issue); Minebea Co. v. Papst, 355 F. Supp. 2d 518, 524 (D.D.C. 2005)
(involving a fraud claim related to the scope of patent licenses).
251. See supra note 238 and accompanying text.
252. See, e.g., Skyline Steel, LLC v. PilePro, LLC, No. 13-CV-8171 (JMF), 2015
WL 4480725, slip op. at *3 (S.D.N.Y. July 22, 2015) (explaining that the defendant in a
patent infringement case could not argue that it acted in good faith and free from any
improper motive and, at the same time, shield as privileged advice that it received from
its lawyers in formulating its course of action) (quoting Pereira v. United Jersey Bank,
No. 94-CV-1565 (LAP), 1997 WL 773716, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 11, 1997)). But cf
2002 Lawrence R. Buchalter Alaska Tr. v. Phila. Fin. Assur. Co., 12 Civ. 6808
(KMK)(PED), 2016 WL 1060336, slip op. at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 11, 2016) (explaining
that "implied reliance [for at-issue exception purposes] is confined to situations involving
a party's state of mind concerning a question of law, such as the party's belief as to the
lawfulness of its conduct," and does not apply where the issue is what a party knew or
reasonably should have known as a factual matter).
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A. Contract Disputes
Courts routinely hold that a party who either alleges that an
agreement does not reflect her intent or alleges that extrinsic evidence is
required to support her interpretation of a contract or establish the
meaning of a contract puts her lawyer's advice concerning the subject at
issue.253 Stovall v. United States254 is a representative case.
Michael Stovall, an African-American farmer, settled a
discrimination claim against the United States Department of Agriculture
(USDA).2 55 Under the parties' "resolution agreement," Stovall waived
his rights against the USDA and its employees in exchange for the
USDA's promise to pay him $145,000, discharge his debts to the
USDA's farm service agency, offer him priority consideration on future
loan applications, and pay his reasonable attorney's fees and costs,
among other relief.256 The USDA's Office of General Counsel (OGC)
helped negotiate and draft the resolution agreement.257 Stovall later sued
the USDA for breaching the agreement when the USDA refused to
extend him additional credit and declined to restructure his existing
loans.258
Stovall attempted to discover a memorandum prepared by the OGC
for the USDA regarding his claims in the new lawsuit.25 9  When the
USDA refused to produce the OGC memorandum on attorney-client
253. See, e.g., Synalloy Corp. v. Gray, 142 F.R.D. 266, 270 (D. Del. 1992) (stating
that by seeking to rescind an agreement due to no meeting of the minds, a defendant
waived its right to prevent disclosure of communications that might show the parties'
intent in entering the agreements); Pitney-Bowes, Inc. v. Mestre, 86 F.R.D. 444, 447
(S.D. Fla. 1980) (reasoning that by alleging it intended to modify some patent licensing
agreements, a party placed its contracting intent at issue); IMC Chems., Inc. v. Niro Inc.,
No. Civ. A. 98-2348- JTM, 2000 WL 1466495, at *23 (D. Kan. July 19, 2000)
("[P]laintiff intends to offer extrinsic evidence about its interpretation of the contract.
Such reliance places the protected information at issue."); Medtronic, Inc. v. Intermedics,
Inc., 162 F.R.D. 133, 13 (D. Minn. 1995) ("To the extent Intermedics intends to offer
extrinsic evidence to bolster its interpretation of the document, it has waived the privilege
attached to [its] interpretation of the document."); MBIA Ins. Corp. v. Patriarch Partners
VIII, LLC, No. 09 Civ. 3255, 2012 WL 2568972, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. July 3, 2012) ("MBIA
has stated that its witnesses will testify concerning their 'intent and interpretation of the
contracts.' Accordingly, the waiver shall be enforced against all documents that concern
those subject matters."); Terry v. Bacon, 269 P.3d 188, 192 (Utah Ct. App. 2011)
(agreeing with the trial court that "by contesting their consent to the settlement
agreement, the [plaintiffs] put their former attorney's conduct at issue and waived the
attorney-client privilege as to that question").
254. 85 Fed. Cl. 810 (Fed. Cl. 2009).
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privilege grounds, he moved to compel its production.2 60 In connection
with the parties' briefing, the court ordered the USDA to state whether
(a) it intended to rely on parol evidence to support its interpretation of
the resolution agreement; and (b) if so, whether that evidence would
involve communications with OGC lawyers.2 6 1 The USDA responded
that "it could not foreclose the possibility" that it would rely on parol
evidence in its defense, some of which "might derive from the OGC
attorneys who helped negotiate and draft the [r]esolution [a]greement."26 2
That response caused the Stovall court to analyze whether the
USDA had "implicitly waived" its attorney-client privilege by reserving
its right to offer parol evidence-including evidence from the OGC-to
263advance its interpretation of the resolution agreement. Indeed,
numerous courts reason that if a party reserves the right to use parol
evidence to support its interpretation of a contract, it may not assert the
privilege to block the discovery of communications with its lawyer that
"form the extrinsic context for the agreement, particularly those that
occurred in negotiating or interpreting the agreement."26 4  Fairness
compels a court to find an implied waiver of the privilege in these
circumstances.265 That was the situation at hand:
[The USDA] ... could not "foreclose the possibility" that it would
rely on extrinsic evidence to support its interpretation of the
agreement. It further indicated that if such evidence were offered, it
"would relate to the contracting parties' intention at the time of
contract formation" and that two of the individuals "possessing
knowledge of the parties' intent during negotiations" were the
"attorneys with the USDA Office of General Counsel who
participated in the negotiation and drafting of the agreement."
Accordingly, when asked, [the USDA] indicated that it might rely
upon evidence taken from the OGC attorneys, thereby ... opening
the door for [Stovall] to conduct discovery regarding the views held
by the OGC attomeys during the drafting and negotiation of the
[r]esolution [a]greement. As such, while the attorney-client privilege
appears to cover the OGC Memorandum, it has been impliedly
waived here. To rule otherwise would be to allow [the USDA] to use
the privilege as a sword and shield-to rely potentially upon parol
evidence from its attorneys to influence the interpretation of the




263. Id. at 815.
264. Stovall, 85 Fed. Cl. at 816 (footnote omitted).
265. Id.
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might be used to rebut that evidence. Fairness does not permit such a
result.2 66
In addition to concluding that Stovall was entitled to obtain the
OGC memorandum, the court ordered the USDA to produce documents
written by its staff that referred to the OGC memorandum and that
referred to communications with OGC lawyers regarding the resolution
agreement's implementation.2 67 According to the Stovall court, these
documents were within the scope of the USDA's subject matter waiver
of its attorney-client privilege.268
In analyzing the decision in Stovall, it is fair to ask why the court
allowed Stovall to obtain the USDA's privileged materials when the
USDA had not affirmatively stated that it intended to call OGC lawyers
as witnesses at trial, but said only that it would not rule out the
possibility. In fact, the court anticipated that argument (the USDA never
made it). 26 9 From the court's perspective, a "wait-and-see approach"
risked having to reopen discovery at an inopportune time-perhaps even
during trial. 2 70 Furthermore, having given the USDA the opportunity to
disavow the use of extrinsic evidence provided by its lawyers-which
the USDA declined to do-the court had to allow discovery into the
drafting and negotiation of the resolution agreement.271 Indeed, under
the circumstances, it would have been unfair to deny Stovall the chance
to conduct such discovery.2 72 The court certainly could not allow the
USDA to blindside Stovall with extrinsic evidence at trial.
B. Employment Litigation
Turning now to employment litigation, it is true in this context as
elsewhere that a defendant that defends against a plaintiffs theories on
the basis that it is not liable because it relied on the advice of counsel
places its lawyer's advice at issue and therefore loses its attorney-client
273
privilege covering related communications. 2 But two categories of
cases stand out for presenting at-issue exception challenges: (1) Fair
266. Id at 816-17.
267. Id. at 817.
268. Id.
269. Id. at 817 n.8.
270. Id.
271. Id.
272. See id. (citing three cases and a treatise).
273. See, e.g., Carson v. Lake Cty., Ind., Cause No. 2:14-cv-1 17-PRC, 2016 WL
1567253, slip op. at *6-9 (N.D. Ind. Apr. 19, 2016) (involving a lawyer's advice
regarding the defendant's compliance with the Age Discrimination in Employment Act
(ADEA) in terminating the plaintiffs' employment).
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Labor Standards Act (FLSA) cases in which the defendant-employer
asserts an affirmative defense that it acted in good faith in classifying
employees as exempt so that it would not have to pay them the statutory
minimum wage or overtime wages, or in arguing that it should not be
liable for liquidated damages if it is found to have violated the FLSA;27 4
and (2) discrimination and harassment cases where the defendant-
employer asserts a Faragher-Ellerth affirmative defense, the name being
derived from two Supreme Court cases.2 75
1. The At-Issue Exception in FLSA Cases
In FLSA cases, an employer may attempt to avoid liability by
asserting that it acted "in good faith in conformity with and in reliance
on" federal administrative regulations, orders, rulings, approvals,
interpretations, practices, or enforcement policies.276 Once found to have
violated the FLSA, an employer may assert its good faith in resisting
liquidated damages.277 An employer may attempt to establish its good
faith by asserting its reliance on advice of counsel,278 plainly putting its
279 oteclawyer's advice at issue. I1 other cases, however, an employer may
274. See Scott v. Chipotle Mex. Grill, Inc., 67 F. Supp. 3d 607, 612-14 (S.D.N.Y.
2014) (explaining the good faith defense in both contexts). See also 29 U.S.C. § 259(a)
(2012) ("[N]o employer shall be subject to any liability or punishment for or on account
of the failure ... to pay minimum wages or overtime compensation under the [FLSA] ...
if he pleads and proves that the act or omission complained of was in good faith in
conformity with and in reliance on any written administrative regulation, order, ruling,
approval, or interpretation, of the agency of the United States specified in subsection (b)
-of this section, or any administrative practice or enforcement policy of such agency with
respect to the class of employers to which he belonged."); 29 U.S.C. § 260 (2012) ("In
any action . .. under the [FLSA] ... if the employer shows to the satisfaction of the court
that the act or omission giving rise to such action was in good faith and that he had
reasonable grounds for believing that his act or omission was not a violation of the
[FLSA] . . . the court may, in its sound discretion, award no liquidated damages or award
any amount thereof not to exceed the amount specified in section 216 of this title.").
275. Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775 (1998); Burlington Indus., Inc. v.
Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742 (1998).
276. 29 U.S.C. § 259(a) (2012).
277. 29 U.S.C. § 260 (2012).
278. See Featsent v. City of Youngstown, 70 F.3d 900, 906-07 (6th Cir. 1995)
("Presumably, the duty of the [City's] attorney was not only to represent the City's
interest, but also to ascertain and follow the dictates of the law, including the FLSA.
There is no evidence that . .. the City's attorney advised the City that the Agreement's
method of calculating overtime compensation violated the FLSA. From its attorney's
silence, the City was entitled to the reasonable belief that the Agreement did not
violate . . . the FLSA."); see also Perez v. Mountaire Farms, 650 F.3d 350, 375-76 (4th
Cir. 2011) (crediting the defendant with good faith based on its reliance on the advice of
a lawyer employed by a trade group).
279. See, e.g., Foster v. City of N.Y., 14 Civ. 4142 (PGG) (JCF), 14 Civ. 9220
(PGG) (JCF), 2016 WL 524639, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 5, 2016) (explaining that the city's
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put its lawyer's advice at issue without meaning to do so, or while trying
to avoid doing so.280 Edwards v. KB Home28' is an interesting case in-
point.
The Edwards plaintiffs alleged that KB Home incorrectly classified
them as exempt outside sales employees who were not entitled to
282overtime wages. KB Home asserted that it correctly classified the
plaintiffs, but further contended that if its classification decision was
mistaken, it was made in the good faith belief it was lawful.283 The
plaintiffs argued that KB Home's assertion of its good faith defense
waived its attorney-client privilege covering communications with its
lawyers that would illuminate the information KB Home had when it
crafted and later applied its classification scheme.284 KB Home
countered that it based its good faith defense not on the advice of its
lawyers, but on "other employees' understanding of Department of Labor
(DOL) opinion letters."2 85
The court acknowledged that if KB Home employees determined
that the company's classification scheme was lawful based solely on
their analysis of the DOL opinion letters, KB Home's privilege would
remain intact.286 But the court doubted that KB Home would have
formulated its classification scheme without the benefit of related legal
advice.2 87 In fact, when pressed, KB Home conceded that its employees
involved in the classification decision did consult with counsel regarding
that decision and the DOL opinion letters, but it reiterated that it was not
288relying on advice of counsel in asserting its good faith defenses.
KB Home's line-drawing caused the Edwards court to ask whether
KB Home could "parse its defense to rely solely on its own nonlawyers'
understanding of the FLSA's outside sales exemption and thus maintain
stated reliance on the advice of counsel in formulating its FLSA compliance policies
waived the privilege regarding related communications).
280. See, e.g., Hicks v. T.L. Cannon Mgmt. Corp., No. 13-cv-6455W, 2015 WL
5167225, at *5 (W.D.N.Y. Sept. 3, 2015) (rejecting the defendant's assurance that it
would limit its good faith defense to one in which its state of mind did not incorporate
legal advice); Scott v. Chipotle Mex. Grill, Inc., 67 F. Supp. 3d 607, 614-17 (S.D.N.Y.
2014) (reasoning that Chipotle could not plead around the good faith requirements of its
statutory defenses by avoiding mention of the advice of counsel).
281. No. 3:11-cv-00240, 2015 WL 4430998 (S.D. Tex. July 18, 2015).




286. Id. at *2.
287. Id. (citing Wang v. Hearst Corp., No. 12 CV 793(HB), 2012 WL 6621717, at *2
(S.D.N.Y. Dec. 19, 2012)).
288. Id. at *1-2.
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as privileged the attorney communications on the same topic[.]"28 9 The
court concluded that KB Home could not:
Two basic aspects of the good faith defenses compel the [c]ourt to
conclude that KB Home is drawing too fine a line: the defenses
require a good faith belief about the lawfulness of a classification
decision. Communications from lawyers-whose very job is to
advise the company on the lawfulness of its policies-concerning the
company's classification decision necessarily influence the
reasonableness of any belief the company has about the lawfulness of
its policy. Otherwise, why seek legal advice (which isn't cheap) at
all? And as a psychological matter, it seems very difficult, if not
impossible, for a witness to compartmentalize his reliance on what he
may have independently understood regarding the law and what he
was told by attorneys.29
The court did not know the substance of KB Home's
communications with its lawyers regarding the FLSA's outside sales
exemption, but it figured they would be "highly probative" of KB
Home's good faith belief in the lawfulness of its policy.2 9 1 The court
further reasoned that recognizing KB Home's distinction between a good
faith defense that relies on the advice of counsel from one that does
not--even though in the latter instance such advice was given-would
effectively bench the at-issue exception to the privilege in FLSA cases.292
The court held that KB Home had waived its attorney-client
privilege by asserting as a defense its good faith belief in the lawfulness
293of its decisions. That waiver was limited, however, and affected only
communications about KB Home's classification decision.294
The Edwards court did not specify which at-issue test it was
applying, but it had to be either the County ofErie or Hearn test, because
if it had applied the Rhone-Poulenc test the outcome would have been
different, as McKee v. PetSmart, Inc. 295 illustrates.
The plaintiffs in McKee were PetSmart operations managers2 96
They sued PetSmart in a Delaware federal court under the FLSA. They
alleged that PetSmart misclassified its operations managers as exempt
employees and consequently failed to pay them overtime wages.297 The
289. Id. at *2.
290. Id.
291. Edwards, 2015 VL 4430998, at *2.
292. Id. at *3 (offering a hypothetical to explain the court's reasoning).
293. Id.
294. Id.
295. 71 F. Supp. 3d 439 (D. Del. 2014).
296. Id. at 440.
297. Id.
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plaintiffs deposed Shane Burris, PetSmart's director of compensation, on
the company's affirmative good faith defense.2 98 Burris testified that he
alone was responsible for deciding whether employees were exempt, and
that he based those decisions on store visits and on conversations with
various people, including members of PetSmart's legal department.299
When the plaintiffs' lawyer asked Burris whether he relied on legal
advice in making his classification decisions, PetSmart's lawyer objected
on attorney-client privilege grounds and instructed Burris not to
answer.3 00
The plaintiffs filed a motion to compel, and argued that PetSmart
could not assert a good faith defense while simultaneously arguing that
the attorney-client privilege shielded from discovery documents and
testimony regarding its state of mind in determining whether its
operations managers were exempt employees.30 1 In response, PetSmart
argued that it was not relying on advice of counsel as part of its good
faith defense and, consequently, the plaintiffs could not force it to
surrender its privilege.302
Citing Rhone-Poulenc, the McKee court concluded that PetSmart
had not waived its attorney-client privilege by asserting its good faith
affirmative defense because it had not relied on privileged
communications or testimony to support that defense.303 Contrary to the
plaintiffs' claims, the court explained, a party does not lose its privilege
when its state of mind is placed at issue in litigation.30 Unlike the cases
from other jurisdictions the plaintiffs cited to support their arguments,
here the defendant's privileged communications were not the only
window into the factual heart of its defense.305 To the contrary, Burris
testified in his deposition that in addition to talking to PetSmart's in-
house lawyers, he visited stores and conferred with finance, human
resources, and field operations personnel to learn about the operations
manager role.306 Regardless, the court was bound by Third Circuit
precedent in the form of Rhone-Poulenc, which supported PetSmart's




301. Id. at 441.
302. Id.
303. Id. at 441-42 (citing Rhone-Poulenc Rorer Inc. v. Home Indem. Co., 32 F.3d
851, 863 (3d Cir. 1994)).
304. Id. at 442 (quoting Rhone-Poulenc, 32 F.3d at 864).
305. McKee, 71 F. Supp. 3d at 443.
306. Id
307. Id. (quoting Rhone-Poulenc, 32 F.3d at 864).
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The contrasting decisions in Edwards and McKee brightly highlight
the importance of the at-issue test a court employs. In jurisdictions
where the law is unsettled, lawyers on both sides must recognize the
critical need for persuasive advocacy on this point.
2. Cases Involving a Faragher-Ellerth Defense
In discrimination and sexual harassment cases, where the alleged
offender is a supervisor and no tangible employment action has been
taken against he employee-plaintiff, the employer-defendant may assert
a Faragher-Ellerth affirmative defense.30s To prevail on this defense, the
employer must show that (1) it exercised reasonable care to prevent and
promptly correct any discriminatory or harassing behavior; and (2) the
employee unreasonably failed either to take advantage of any corrective
or preventive opportunities provided by the employer or to otherwise
avoid harm.309 Courts frequently hold that an employer's assertion of a
Faragher-Ellerth affirmative defense waives its attorney-client privilege
with respect to any pre-suit investigation into the plaintiffs complaints
and remedial efforts taken in response.3' 0 These courts reason that an
employer's assertion of this defense places its lawyer's advice at issue.311
It is possible, however, for a defendant to raise a Faragher-Ellerth
defense that is not based on its investigation of the plaintiff s claims, and
retain its privilege.312
308. EEOC v. Outback Steakhouse of Fla., Inc., 251 F.R.D. 603, 611 (D. Colo.
2008).
309. See Vance v. Ball State Univ., 133 S. Ct. 2434, 2439 (2013) (simplifying the
Faragher-Ellerth elements).
310. Outback Steakhouse, 251 F.R.D. at 611; see, e.g., Koumoulis v. Indep. Fin.
Mktg. Grp., Inc., 29 F. Supp. 3d 142, 148 (E.D.N.Y. 2014); Koss v. Palmer Water Dep't,
977 F. Supp. 2d 28, 29-30 (D. Mass. 2013); Musa-Muaremi v. Florists' Transworld
Delivery, Inc., 270 F.R.D. 312, 317-18 (N.D. Ill. 2010); Walker v. Cty. of Contra Costa,
227 F.R.D. 529, 535 (N.D. Cal. 2005).
311. See, e.g., Weinberg v. William Blair & Co., LLC, No. 12 CV 9846, 2014 WL
2699714, at *1 (N.D. Ill. June 13, 2014) (discussing the at-issue exception and stating
that because William Blair asserted a Faragher-Ellerth defense, "information pertinent to
the reasonableness and adequacy of its investigation and response to [the plaintiffs]
claims [was] discoverable").
312. See, e.g., Robinson v. Vineyard Vines, LLC, 15 Civ. 4972 (VB)(JCM), 2016
WL 845283, at *5-6 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 4, 2016) (enforcing the defendants' privilege where
they were merely asserting as a defense (1) the existence of anti-harassment policies, and
(2) the plaintiffs failure to take advantage of them, and never meant to assert a
Faragher-Ellerth defense as to any investigation into the plaintiffs claims); Mendez v.
St. Alphonsus Reg'1 Med. Ctr., No. 1:12-cv-26-EJL-CWD, 2014 WL 3406015, at *4 (D.
Idaho July 10, 2014) (stating that the attorney-client privilege and work product
immunity are not waived if the defendant does not rely on an investigation in support of
its Faragher-Ellerth defense, and finding no waiver); Crutcher-Sanchez v. Cty. of
Dakota, Neb., No. 8:09CV288, 2011 WL 612061, at *10 (D. Neb. Feb. 10, 2011) ("It
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In summary, a defendant that asserts a Faragher-Ellerth affirmative
defense based on the reasonableness of its investigation into the
plaintiffs allegations of discrimination or harassment should assume that
it will put its lawyers' advice at issue and thus surrender its attorney-
client privilege at least to some degree. Thinking ahead, an employer
that uses outside counsel to conduct such an investigation should retain
different lawyers to defend it in subsequent litigation to avoid the
argument that its trial counsel should be disqualified because they are
likely to be necessary witnesses by virtue of their investigative
activities.313 An employer should also want separate trial counsel in case
alleged deficiencies in the investigation create a conflict of interest
between it and the investigating lawyers.3 14
C. Insurance Bad Faith Litigation
However frequently the at-issue exception ambushes unwary
lawyers and parties in contract and employment litigation, no area of the
law is as uncertain from an attorney-client privilege standpoint as
insurance bad faith litigation. Insurers have seen their attorney-client
privilege steadily eroded by courts applying at-issue doctrine.31
By way of background, insurance policies include an implied duty
of good faith and fair dealing.316 An insurer that breaches this duty
commits the tort of bad faith.3 17 Indeed, an insurer's duty of good faith
and its liability for bad faith refer to the same obligation.3 18
In the liability insurance context, bad faith claims typically arise out
of an insurance company's allegedly unreasonable failure to settle a
covered suit against its insured within its policy limits followed by a
does not appear the defendants rely on the adequacy of the investigation as an affirmative
defense. . . . The defendants did not waive privilege ... by generally alleging they may
rely on the Ellerth/Faragher defense to vicarious liability .....").
313. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 3.7(a) (AM. BAR Ass'N 2016) (stating
that a lawyer "shall not act as advocate at a trial in which the lawyer is likely to be a
necessary witness," subject to three exceptions).
314. See id. at r. 1.7(a)(2) (discussing material limitation conflicts).
315. See, e.g., Hege v. Aegon USA, LLC, C/A Nos. 8:10-cv-1578-GRA, 7:10-cv-
1630-GRA, 7:10-cv-1631-GRA, 1:10-cv-1635-GRA, 2011 WL 1791883, at *4-5 (D.S.C.
May 10, 2011) (applying South Carolina law and finding that the insurer had placed its
lawyers' advice at issue).
316. ROBERT H. JERRY, II & DOUGLAS R. RICHMOND, UNDERSTANDING INSURANCE
LAW 157 (5th ed. 2012).
317. Maxwell v. Hartford Union High Sch. Dist., 814 N.W.2d 484, 497 (Wis. 2012).
318. Brown v. Patel, 157 P.3d 117, 121 n.5 (Okla. 2007); United States Fid. & Guar.
Ins. Co. v. United States Sports Specialty Ass'n, 270 P.3d 464, 470 (Utah 2012); Mut. of
Enumclaw Ins. Co. v. Dan Paulson Constr., Inc., 169 P.3d 1, 8 n. 11 (Wash. 2007).
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judgment against the insured exceeding those limits. 9 Depending on
the jurisdiction, "reasonableness" may be measured against a negligence
standard, or a court may require something more on the insurer's part,
such as dishonesty, malice, oppression, or recklessness.320 Bad faith
liability in first-party insurance-that is, all types of insurance except
liability insurance-generally requires a plaintiff to establish (1) that the
insurer's conduct in delaying or refusing payment of a claim was
unreasonable, and (2) that the insurer either knew or recklessly
disregarded the fact that it had no reasonable basis for denying or
delaying the payment of benefits.3 2' Other courts modify the second
prong so that the test is whether the insurer knew or reasonably should
have known that it was acting unreasonably in handling or paying the
claim at issue.322
In deciding whether to settle or pay claims, insurers regularly
consult with coverage counsel to evaluate their contractual obligations or
duties.323 If the insurer is later sued for bad faith, the question is whether
the insurer's defense strategy in the bad faith case puts its privileged
communications with coverage counsel in the underlying action at issue.
An insurer that asserts advice of counsel as a defense to a bad faith claim
324
clearly puts privileged communications at issue,32 but most cases are not
so clear cut, and courts in those cases have reached disparate results.325
319. See, e.g., Mid-America Bank & Tr. Co. v. Com. Union Ins. Co., 587 N.E.2d 81,
82-84 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992) (failing to settle for $30,000 under a policy with liability limits
of $50,000, followed by a plaintiffs verdict of over $911,000).
320. JERRY & RICHMOND, supra note 316, at 166-68.
321. See, e.g., Mohney v. Am. Gen. Life Ins. Co., 116 A.3d 1123, 1131 (Pa. Super.
Ct. 2015) (reciting these elements and noting further that "[b]ad faith claims are fact
specific"); Town of Ira v. Vt. League of Cities & Towns-Prop. & Cas. Intermunicipal
Fund, Inc., 109 A.3d 893, 901 (Vt. 2014) (quoting Bushey v. Allstate Ins. Co., 670 A.2d
807, 809 (Vt. 1995)); Sonnett v. First Am. Title Ins. Co., 309 P.3d 799, 806 (Wyo. 2013)
(quoting Matlack v. Mountain W. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 44 P.3d 73, 81 (Wyo.
2002)).
322. See, e.g., Gardner v. Hartford Ins. Accident & Indem. Co., 659 N.W.2d 198, 206
(Iowa 2003); May v. Ticor Title Ins., 422 S.W.3d 93, 102 (Tex. App. 2014).
323. An insurer generally cannot be held liable for bad faith where coverage for an
occurrence or a loss was fairly debatable. Desert Mountain Props. L.P. v. Liberty Mut.
Fire Ins. Co., 236 P.3d 421, 442 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2010); Wacker-Ciocco v. Gov't Emps.
Ins. Co., 110 A.3d 962, 967 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2015); Murphy v. Patriot Ins. Co.,
106 A.3d 911, 917 (Vt. 2014).
324. Assertion of an advice of counsel defense does not put all of an insurer's
privileged communications at issue. See, e.g., Ex parte Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 990
So. 2d 355, 364 (Ala. 2008) ("Nationwide's assertion of the advice-of-counsel defense
and its production of privileged documents supporting that defense did not waive the
attorney-client privilege as to communications between Nationwide and its counsel
occurring after Nationwide denied coverage, because those documents were not placed at
issue by the assertion of the defense."); Bertelsen v. Allstate Ins. Co., 796 N.W.2d 685,
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State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Lee326 is a leading
case on the at-issue exception in insurance bad faith litigation. Lee was a
class action in which State Farm insureds with multiple State Farm
policies disputed the company's refusal to permit the stacking of
uninsured and underinsured motorist coverages.327 In discovery, State
Farm acknowledged that it sought and received legal advice as to
whether it should pay the plaintiffs' claims.328 State Farm denied that it
was asserting an advice of counsel defense, and withheld its
correspondence with counsel regarding its denial of stacking claims as
privileged.32 9 The plaintiffs moved to compel discovery, asserting that
703 (S.D. 2011) (cautioning that "a client only waives the privilege to the extent
necessary to reveal the advice of counsel he placed at issue").
325. Compare Smith v. Scottsdale Ins. Co., 621 F. App'x 743, 746 (4th Cir. 2015)
(concluding that Scottsdale did not lose its privilege because it asserted no claims or
defenses based on counsel's advice in the underlying case; it maintained that its actions
were based on its own case evaluation and the insured's unwillingness to consent to a
settlement, rather than discrimination against the plaintiffs), and Griffith v. Allstate Ins.
Co., 90 F. Supp. 3d 344, 347-48 (M.D. Pa. 2014) (concluding that he at-issue exception
did not apply because Allstate did not plead reliance on advice of counsel), and Everest
Indem. Ins. Co. v. Rea, 342 P.3d 417, 420 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2015) (explaining that
Everest's subjective good faith belief and consultations with counsel before entering into
a settlement agreement did not trigger the at-issue exception where Everest did not assert
as a defense its dependence on advice of counsel in forming its subjective beliefs
regarding the appropriate course of conduct), and Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Aetna Cas. &
Sur. Co., 730 A.2d 51, 61 (Conn. 1999) ("Compliance with contract terms is generally an
element in all contractual actions, yet reliance upon legal advice within the process of
adhering to contract terms does not automatically place the actual legal advice at issue...
. [E]ven though . . . the plaintiffs senior officials may have stated in depositions that
advice of counsel was a significant motivating factor in [their] decisions to settle . .. the
privileged documents are not at issue because the plaintiff is not relying on the privileged
communications to prove that those settlements were reasonable.") (citation omitted),
with Ingram v. Great Am. Ins. Co., 112 F. Supp. 3d 934, 938-39 (D. Ariz. 2015)
(determining that he defendants' decisions incorporating their lawyers' advice and their
assertion of a subjective good faith defense put their lawyers' advice at issue), and
Tackett v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 653 A.2d 254, 260 (Del. 1995) ("[W]here, as here,
an insurer makes factual representations which implicitly rely upon legal advice as
justification for non-payment of claims, the insurer cannot shield itself from disclosure of
the complete advice of counsel relevant to the handling of the claim."), and Boone v.
Vanliner Ins. Co., 744 N.E.2d 154, 158 (Ohio 2001) (holding that in a bad faith action,
"the insured is entitled to discover claims file materials containing attorney-client
communications related to the issue of coverage that were created prior to the denial of
coverage"), and Cedell v. Farmers Ins. Co., 295 P.3d 239, 246 (Wash. 2013) (starting
"from the presumption that there is no attorney-client privilege relevant between the
insured and the insurer in the claims adjusting process, and that the attorney-client and
work product privileges are generally not relevant," although it is possible for the insurer
to overcome that presumption).
326. 13 P.3d 1169 (Ariz. 2000).
327. Id. at 1171.
328. Id. at 1172.
329. Id.
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State Farm had implicitly waived the privilege by injecting the
"subjective good faith beliefs and mental state of its claims people as an
issue in the case."330 The trial court agreed.331
State Farm appealed to the Arizona Court of Appeals, which applied
the Hearn test, and found that State Farm had not impliedly waived its
privilege because it had never put its lawyers' advice at issue.332 The
case then made its way to the Arizona Supreme Court.
The Arizona Supreme Court noted that it had adopted the Hearn test
in prior cases but disagreed that its application supported the lower
appellate court's conclusion.333  The court then moved on, in "this
unusual case," to the proper characterization of State Farm's defense.334
The court decided that State Farm characterized its position best:
State Farm asserts that its conduct was objectively reasonable and
subjectively reasonable and in good faith because of what its policies,
the statute and the case law actually said (not what State Farm's
lawyers said they said), and because of what its personnel actually
knew and did (not what State Farm's lawyers told them to do). 335
State Farm had its employees evaluate the law on stacking,
including cases, policy provisions, and statutes.336 As part of that
evaluation, State Farm employees were advised by counsel.337 State
Farm admitted that i s employees received legal advice, but asserted that
its ultimate decisions were those of its employees; it did not decide
whether to pay or deny a claim because of its lawyers' advice.3 3 8 The
Lee court agreed with the trial court that based on these admitted facts,
State Farm made advice of counsel a part of its defense.
Next, the court noted that an insurer's mere denial of the allegations
in a complaint or petition does not effect a waiver, nor does an insurer
waive its attorney-client privilege by asserting that it treated its insured
in good faith.3 @ On the other hand, an insurer's express reliance on
advice of counsel as a defense is an implied waiver of the attorney-client
privilege under any test.341 But what of the vast middle ground?
330. Id
331. Id. at 1172-73.
332. Id. at 1173-74.
333. Id. at 1174.
334. Id
335. Id.




340. Id. at 1175.
341. Id.
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The court reasoned that "a litigant's affirmative disavowal of
express reliance on [a] privileged communication is not enough to
prevent a finding of waiver."342 A litigant cannot argue that it acted
reasonably because it educated itself on the law when its investigation
and knowledge of the law includes legal advice, and then invoke the
attorney-client privilege to prevent its adversary from discovering what it
learned.34 3 At some point, fairness preempts the privilege.34 The court
determined that he proper focus was whether the litigant asserting the
privilege .'ha[d] interjected the issue into the litigation and whether the
claim of privilege, if upheld, would deny the inquiring party access to
proof needed fairly to resist the client's own evidence on that very
issue."'34 5 Thus:
The party that would assert the privilege has not waived [it] unless it
has asserted some claim or defense, such as the reasonableness of its
evaluation of the law, which necessarily includes the information
received from counsel. In that situation, the party claiming the
privilege has interjected the issue of advice of counsel into the
litigation to the extent that recognition of the privilege would deny
the opposing party access to proof without which it would be
impossible for the factfinder to fairly determine the very issue raised
by that party. We believe such a point is reached when, as in the
present case, the party asserting the privilege claims its conduct was
proper and permitted by law and based in whole or in part on its
evaluation of the state of the law. In that situation, the party's
knowledge about he law is vital, and the advice of counsel is highly
relevant to the legal significance of the client's conduct. Add to that
the fact that the truth cannot be found absent exploration of that issue,
and the conditions [for implied waiver] are met. 46
State Farm's claims managers could not testify that they surveyed
the law and thus believed that their actions were legal, but deny the
plaintiffs the opportunity to probe the foundation for those assertions.34 7
By affirmatively injecting its claims managers' legal knowledge into the
litigation, State Farm placed the sources of that knowledge at issue and
impliedly waived its attorney-client privilege.348
342. Id. at 1177.
343. Id.
344. Id at 1178-79.
345. Id. at 1179 (quoting RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS §
80 cmt. b (AM. LAW INST. 2000)).
346. Lee, 13 P.3d at 1179 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
347. Id. at 1182.
348. Id.
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State Farm contended that it was the plaintiffs who had injected the
subjective belief of its claims staff into the case by alleging that State
Farm had deliberately misinterpreted the law to suit itself.349 But that
argument ignored the basis of the court's decision:
It is true that [the] [p]laintiffs raised the subjective bad faith of State
Farm's employees, but it is not State Farm's denial of that allegation
that waives the privilege. Nor does State Farm's affirmative
assertion of good faith waive the privilege. It is, rather, State Farm's
affirmative assertion that its actions were reasonable because of its
evaluation of the law, based on its interpretation of the policies,
statutes, and case law, and because of what its personnel actually
knew and did.
But what its personnel did . .. was to consult. counsel and obtain
counsel's views of the meaning of the policies, statutes, and case law.
Having asserted that its actions were reasonable because of what it
knew about the applicable law, State Farm has put in issue the
information it obtained from counsel.350
While acknowledging that it would be difficult for State Farm to
meet the plaintiffs' allegations without asserting that it studied relevant
law, the Lee court reasoned that State Farm could simply deny that it
acted unlawfully and defend its conduct as being objectively
reasonable.35 1 The plaintiffs would then have to prove that it acted
unreasonably.352  Even so, State Farm was in some ways caught
"between Scylla and Charybdis."3 53
There is much not to like about Lee. Although Lee supposedly
holds that to waive the attorney-client privilege "a party must make an
affirmative claim that its conduct was based on its understanding of the
advice of counsel-it is not sufficient that the party consult with counsel
and receive advice,"354 in fact, State Farm was found to have waived the
privilege because its claims managers consulted with counsel and
thereafter factored the lawyers' advice into their decisions. If you accept
the Lee position that an affirmative act for at-issue exception purposes
requires more than seeking and receiving legal advice, then asserting a
subjective good faith defense ought not qualify as an affirmative act
349. Id.
350. Id. at 1180-81.
351. Id. at 1182 (citing United States v. Bilzerian, 926 F.2d 1285, 1292-93 (2d Cir.
1991)).
352. Id.
353. Id. at 1183.
354. Everest Indem. Ins. Co. v. Rea, 342 P.3d 417, 419 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2015) (citing
Lee, 13 P.3d at 1177).
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either, because there is no point in consulting a lawyer if you are not
going to at least listen to her advice in charting a course of action. There
also appears to be little difference between an insurer arguing that it did
not act in bad faith because it acted in conformity with applicable law,
which does not put its lawyers' advice at issue,355 or defending based on
objective reasonableness having consulted with a lawyer to evaluate the
reasonableness of its position, which again preserves its privilege,3 56 and
defending based on its subjective good faith belief in the legality of its
actions, which places its lawyers' advice at issue and abrogates its
privilege.
Lee further points out the serious problem with the Hearn or County
ofErie tests for the at-issue exception any time a party asserts a claim or
defense involving its subjective good faith: to assert the claim or
defense, the party must be prepared to surrender its attorney-client
privilege. Alternatively, to protect its privilege, it must forgo the claim
or defense. Regardless of whether you describe this as placing the party
between Scylla and Charbydis, between the devil and the deep blue sea,
between a rock and a hard place, or on the horns of a dilemma, it
unwisely and unnecessarily erodes the privilege. It certainly upsets the
longstanding principle that recognizing the privilege is positive because
it encourages parties to seek early legal assistance.357
To be sure, the plaintiff trying to overcome a subjective good faith
defense will argue that the defendant's rejection of its lawyer's advice
would be evidence of a lack of good faith and that it can learn as much
only if it can pierce the defendant's privilege. In other words, a
defendant asserting a subjective good faith defense has put its lawyer's
advice at issue. But that argument assumes too much. A defendant's
rejection of its lawyer's advice does not necessarily evidence bad faith; it
might also evidence the defendant's reasonable belief that its lawyer was
wrong or that other legitimate factors reduce the weight it should assign
to its lawyer's advice. Furthermore, the plaintiff does not need to invade
the defendant's privilege to defeat a subjective good faith defense. The
same evidence the plaintiff will offer to try to overcome the defendant's
objective reasonableness defense will, if it is sufficient for that purpose,
also disprove subjective good faith. After all, the fact finder is bound to
conclude that the defendant cannot have subjectively believed that it
355. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Clancy, 936 N.E.2d 272, 278 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010), vacated
on other grounds, 950 N.E.2d 1201 (Ind. 2011), appeal dismissed per mediated
settlement, 945 N.E.2d 149 (Ind. 2011).
356. Nguyen v. Am. Commerce Ins. Co., No. 1 CA-CV 12-0862, 2014 WL 1381384,
at *5 (Ariz. Ct. App. Apr. 8, 2014).
357. See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
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acted in good faith in the face of evidence sufficient to prove that its
conduct was objectively unreasonable.
Finally, for now, a further consequence of applying either the Hearn
or County of Erie test when a party's subjective good faith forms part of
a claim or defense is to shift control of the privilege from the client to a
third party-pointedly, an adversary in litigation. That stands attorney-
client privilege law on its head.
The uncertainty of the attorney-client privilege in bad faith litigation
is illustrated by comparing the decision in Lee to the decision in Botkin v.
Donegal Mutual Insurance Co.3"s The Botkin court applied the Hearn
test on facts reasonably similar to those in Lee, yet reached a polar
opposite conclusion.
The Botkins sued Donegal after the insurer denied their claim for
damage to two antique cars.359 In deciding whether to deny the claims,
Donegal sought coverage advice from Craig Roswell and David
Lampton of the Niles, Barton & Wilmer law firm (collectively Niles
Barton).36 0 The Botkins sought to discover communications between
Niles Barton and Donegal on the theory that Donegal had placed at issue
the advice it received from Niles Barton.36' Specifically, the Botkins
argued that Donegal placed Niles Barton's advice at issue during the
deposition of one of its claims handlers, Stacey Callahan.3 62  When
Callahan was asked whether Niles Barton's advice "ha[d] anything to do
with Donegal's decision to deny coverage," she answered that "[t]he
Niles Barton firm had given us the coverage analysis, and based on their
analysis-partially based on their analysis, we denied coverage."363
When later asked whether she agreed with Donegal's denial of coverage,
she testified that she relied on the superior experience of her supervisors
and managers in making that determination, and that the coverage
analysis from Niles Barton supplied additional support for the denial.364
Applying the Hearn test,365 the Botkin court agreed with Donegal
that the insurer had not affirmatively placed its lawyers' advice at
366issue. Donegal had neither pled an advice of counsel defense nor
made Niles Barton's advice an element of any other defense.367
358. No. 5:10cv00077, 2011 WL 2447939 (W.D. Va. June 15, 2011).
359. See id. at *3 (discussing the Botkins' loss).
360. Id. at *4.




365. Id. at *4.
366. Id. at *6-7.
367. Id. at *6.
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Callahan's elicited deposition testimony that Niles Barton's advice
"factored into Donegal's decision to deny coverage" did not show that
Donegal had injected its lawyers' advice into the litigation.368 Donegal's
mere reliance on Niles Barton's advice did not implicate the at-issue
exception. It would be pointless for an insurer to retain coverage
counsel if it did not intend to rely on their opinion.370 Moreover, to hold
otherwise would be to discourage insurers from seeking coverage
advice.3
The court observed that Donegal had not tried to use the attorney-
client privilege as both a shield and a sword.372 Its reliance on Niles
Barton's coverage opinion was not enough to show that it had put its
lawyers' advice at issue.3 73 Thus, the first element of the Hearn test-
i.e., the assertion of the privilege was the result of some affirmative act
by the asserting party-had not been met.374
Although it was applying the Hearn test, the Botkin court was not
persuaded by the second element, which requires, for the at-issue
exception to apply, that the asserting party through its affirmative act
make the privileged communications relevant to the case.375 Relying on
Rhone-Poulenc, the court reasoned that while Callahan's testimony
might have made Niles Barton's advice relevant to the case, relevance
was not the standard for deciding whether the attorney-client privilege
protects communications against disclosure.37 6 "If relevance were the
standard, the interest served by the attorney-client privilege-ensuring a
client that he or she can consult with counsel in confidence-would be
completely undermined."
377
The court concluded that application of the Hearn factors did not
"establish implied waiver in this case."378  It therefore held that the
Botkins could not penetrate Donegal's attorney-client privilege and,
simultaneously, that Donegal was prohibited from mentioning Niles
Barton's coverage opinion at trial.379
368. Botkin, 2011 WL 2447939, at *6.
369. Id.
370. Id.
371. See id. (reasoning that "if reliance always gave rise to waiver [of the attorney-
client privilege] in this circumstance, no ne would seek coverage counsel's advice").
372. Id. at *7.
373. Id
374. Id.
375. Id. at *4 (citing Hearn v. Rhay, 68 F.R.D. 574, 581 (E.D. Wash. 1975)).
376. Id. at *7 (quoting Rhone-Poulenc Rorer Inc. v. Home Indem. Co., 32 F.3d 851,
864 (3d Cir. 1994)).
377. Id. (citing Rhone-Poulenc, 32 F.3d at 864).
378. Botkin, 2011 WL 2447939, at *7.
379. Id
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D. The Use ofPrivileged Documents in Deposition Preparation
Finally, regardless of the type of litigation, lawyers may use
privileged documents in preparing clients-or, in the case of
organizational clients, corporate representatives or other key
employees-to testify in depositions as fact witnesses. Concern often
surfaces where the deponent, in preparing to testify, reviews attorney-
client privileged documents to refresh her memory. The concern, of
course, is that the deponent's review of privileged materials to refresh
her recollection before testifying puts those materials at issue and thereby
exposes them to discovery.
State courts are split on this subject. In State ex rel. Polytech, Inc.
v. Voorhees,3 80 for example, the Missouri Supreme Court held that a
witness's use of a privileged document o refresh her recollection before
testifying (as compared to using them while testifying) did not abrogate
the attorney-client privilege.3 81 In contrast, in Las Vegas Development
Associates, LLC v. Eighth Judicial District Court,3 82 the Nevada
Supreme Court concluded that when a witness uses a privileged
document to refresh her recollection before giving a deposition, the
opposing party is entitled to have the document produced at the
deposition under a Nevada statute addressing witnesses' use of
documents to refresh their recollection either before or while testifying at
hearings.383
There is significant confusion surrounding the issue in federal
courts. This confusion is attributable to the overlap or interplay between
the common law at-issue exception to the privilege and Federal Rule of
Evidence 612. Rule 612 provides that if a witness refreshes her memory
with a document while testifying, an adversary may inspect the document
on the spot, cross-examine the witness on it, and introduce into evidence
any portion of the document that relates to the witness's testimony.384 If
a witness uses a document to refresh her testimony before testifying,
Rule 612 affords an opponent the same options if the district court
"decides that justice requires" as much.385 Although the opposing party's
options are phrased in terms of a witness's testimony at a "hearing,"386
Rule 612 unquestionably applies to witnesses' use of documents to
380. 895 S.W.2d 13 (Mo. 1995).
381. Id. at 15.
382. 325 P.3d 1259 (Nev. 2014).
383. Id. at 1265.
384. FED. R. EviD. 612(a)(1) & (b).
385. FED. R. EVID. 612(a)(2) & (b).
386. FED. R. EvID. 612(b).
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refresh their memories in preparation for depositions.8 Indeed,
numerous Rule 612 cases focus on witnesses' use of documents to
refresh their memories before giving depositions.38
For Rule 612 to apply, a witness must use a document to refresh her
recollection.389  A witness's review of a document for some other
purpose does not implicate the rule.3 90 For that matter, a witness's
review of a document to refresh her recollection for a reason other than
testifying does not entitle an adversary to see or use the document under
Rule 612.391 Furthermore, even if a witness reviews a document to
refresh her memory for the purpose of testifying, the document is
exposed under Rule 612 only if she used the document to refresh her
392memory on a subject relevant to the case.
Where a witness reviews a document to refresh her memory and it
does not have that effect, the adversary is not entitled to the document
under Rule 612. Courts often explain this result by reference to
witnesses' reliance on disputed documents.394 That is, unless a document
387. See Hiskett v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 180 F.R.D. 403, 406 (D. Kan. 1998)
(citing FED. R. Civ. P. 30(c)); Sauer v. Burlington N. R.R. Co., 169 F.R.D. 120, 123 n.2
(D. Minn. 1996) (citing FED. R. Cry. P. 30(c)).
388. See, e.g., Hiskett, 180 F.R.D. at 407-08 (reasoning that a witness who reviewed
a document during a break in a deposition had reviewed the document "before testifying"
rather than "while testifying" for purposes of deciding whether disclosure of the
document was mandatory or discretionary).
389. FED. R. EvID. 612(a); see also Sporck v. Peil, 759 F.2d 312, 317 (3d Cir. 1985)
(instructing that "if the witness is not using the document to refresh his memory, that
document has no relevance to any attempt to test the credibility and memory of the
witness").
390. See In re Kellogg, Brown & Root, Inc., 796 F.3d 137, 144 (D.C. Cir. 2015)
(quoting FED. R. Civ. P. 612(a); see also 4 JACK B. WEINSTEIN & MARGARET A. BERGER,
WEINSTEIN'S FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 612.04(2)(b)(i) (2d ed. 1997)); Fed. Trade Comm'n v.
Directv, Inc., Case No. 15-cv-01129-HSG (MEJ), 2015 WL 7775274, at *5 (N.D. Cal.
Dec. 3, 2015) (quoting FED. R. Cv. P. 612(a)).
391. See In re Managed Care Litig., 415 F. Supp. 2d 1378, 1380 (S.D. Fla. 2006)
(citing Sporck, 759 F.2d at 317).
392. See, e.g., United States EEOC v. Cont'l Airlines, Inc., 395 F. Supp. 2d 738, 745
(N.D. Ill. 2005) ("So, while Mr. Graden's review of the investigative notebook may have
impacted his testimony, the testimony at issue does not involve substantive issues in this
case.").
393. See FED. R. EVID. 612 advisory committee notes (1972 Proposed Rules)
(explaining that Rule 612 is not a pretext "for wholesale exploration of an opposing
party's files" and is meant to apply "only to those writings which may fairly be said in
fact to have an impact upon the testimony of the witness"). But see Hiskett, 180 F.R.D. at
407 (stating in dicta that "[a]ctual refreshment of recollection" is unnecessary under Rule
612).
394. See, e.g., Suss v. MSX Int'l Eng'g Serys., Inc., 212 F.R.D. 159, 165 (S.D.N.Y.
2002) ("Even were the [c]ourt to allow disclosure ... this would not be an appropriate
case because [the] movants have failed to demonstrate that the witnesses relied on the
documents in question. 'Relied upon' means more than simply reviewing.").
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has some "demonstrated impact" on a witness's testimony, "the witness
cannot be deemed to have relied on the document," and Rule 612 does
not permit its disclosure as a result.39 5 "Reliance" may also be another
way to explain the conclusion that a document is discoverable under
Rule 612 only where the subject the witness is refreshing her memory on
is relevant to the case.396
If a witness used a document to refresh her memory before
testifying and the subject on which she refreshed herself is relevant to the
case, disclosure of the document is still not automatic; rather, the party
must produce the document only if the district court "decides that justice
requires" it.39 7 This is a discretionary call on the district court's part.3 98
If a court in its discretion orders a document's disclosure, it must, at the
disclosing party's request, redact any unrelated information.3 99
Disclosure of a privileged document does not allow an adversary to
inquire into confidential discussions the lawyer and witness may have
had about the topics to which the document relates-those discussions
remain privileged.40
So how should a court exercise its discretion under Rule 612 when a
witness reviews an attorney-client privileged document to refresh her
memory for purposes of testifying at a deposition on a subject relevant to
the case? The answer is that a court should find that the privilege has
been lost only if there was some waiver or applicable exception apart
from the rule, such as where the subject document was shared with
someone outside the privileged relationship.401 A witness's review of his
own privileged documents should not expose them to an adversary.402
After all, Rule 612 does not purport to change attorney-client privilege
law in general.403
But how courts should exercise their discretion and how they
actually do so are very different matters. In practice, courts' application
of Rule 612 to attorney-client privileged documents is unpredictable.
While some courts carefully guard the privilege and take the approach
395. Id.
396. See id. ("'Relied upon' means more than simply reviewing.").
397. See FED. R. EvID. 612(a)(2).
398. Coryn Grp. II, LLC v. O.C. Seacrets, Inc., 265 F.R.D. 235, 240 (D. Md. 2010);
see In re Managed Care Litig., 415 F. Supp, 2d 1378, 1380 (S.D. Fla. 2006).
399. FED. R. EvID. 612(b).
400. Estate of Jaquez ex rel. Pub. Adm'r of Bronx Cty. v. City of N.Y., No. 10 Civ.
2881(KBF), 2014 WL 5369091, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 10, 2014).
401. See Suss v. MSX Int'l Eng'g Servs., Inc., 212 F.R.D. 159, 164 (S.D.N.Y. 2002).
402. See id; see, e.g., Teleglobe USA, Inc. v. BCE Inc. (In re Teleglobe Commc'ns
Corp.), 392 B.R. 561, 586-87 (Bankr. D. Del. 2008) (upholding the privilege).
403. Suss, 212 F.R.D. at 164.
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recommended above,404 others freely hold that Rule 612 abrogates the
attorney-client privilege.405 Still other courts attempt to balance these
two approaches by applying a "functional analysis."406 Using functional
analysis, a document must have sufficient impact on a witness's
testimony before a court will order its disclosure under Rule 612.407
The principle that a party cannot place an opponent's privileged
communications at issue by its own pleading of claims or defenses408
extends to the use of privileged documents in deposition preparation, as
In re Kellogg, Brown & Root, Inc.409 illustrates. In that case, plaintiff
Harry Barko sued Kellogg, Brown & Root (KBR) under the False Claims
Act for allegedly inflating costs and accepting kickbacks while
administering military contracts in Iraq.410 KBR conducted an internal
investigation of Barko's allegations. Invoking Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 30(b)(6), Barko sought to depose a KBR corporate
representative regarding the internal investigation.411 KBR produced
Christopher Heinrich as its corporate representative, subject to its claim
of attorney-client privilege.4 12
In the deposition, Barko's lawyer asked Heinrich what he had done
to prepare for his testimony, and Heinrich answered that he had reviewed
privileged documents related to the internal investigation known to the
parties and to the court as the "COBC documents.'A13 KBR's lawyer
404. See, e.g., In re Managed Care Litig., 415 F. Supp. 2d 1378, 1381 (S.D. Fla.
2006); Suss, 212 F.R.D. at 164-65; In re Teleglobe, 392 B.R. at 587.
405. See, e.g., Thomas v. Euro RSCG Life, 264 F.R.D. 120, 122 (S.D.N.Y. 2010)
(stating that the plaintiff waived the attorney-client privilege covering some notes when
she used the notes to prepare for her deposition testimony); Ehrlich v. Howe, 848 F.
Supp. 482, 493 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (explaining that when confronted with a conflict
between disclosure of a document under Rule 612 and protection under the attorney-
client privilege, the weight of authority holds that the privilege is waived) (quoting S & A
Painting Co. v. O.W.B. Corp., 103 F.R.D. 407, 408 (W.D. Pa. 1984) (collecting cases)).
406. See, e.g., Calandra v. Sodexho, Inc., No. 3:06CV49 (WWE), 2007 WL
1245317, at *4 (D. Conn. Apr. 27, 2007) (choosing to apply the "functional analysis test"
because it "recognizes both the special protection [that] must be afforded to privileged
documents and the existence of circumstances where review of privileged documents is
necessary in order to conduct an effective examination of the witness").
407. See, e.g., id. (enforcing the privilege where the plaintiffs notes "had minimal
impact on his testimony"); Hiskett v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 180 F.R.D. 403, 408 (D.
Kan. 1998) ("Applying the discretionary standard accorded by [Rule 612], the court finds
that the interests of justice require no production. The review of the document by [the]
plaintiff had minimal impact upon her testimony.").
408. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
409. 796 F.3d 137 (D.C. Cir. 2015).
410. Id. at 140 (quoting an earlier decision in the case).
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repeatedly instructed Heinrich not t  answer questions about the contents
of the internal investigation and he complied.414 Barko thereafter moved
to compel production of the COBC documents under Rule 612.415 The
district court conducted a balancing test and concluded "'fairness
considerations support[ed] disclosure' based on [a] 'context-specific
determination about the fairness of the proceedings and whether
withholding the documents [was] consistent with the purposes of
attorney-client privilege.",416 KBR then petitioned the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit for a writ of mandamus.4 17
The In re Kellogg, Brown & Root court concluded that the district
court had clearly erred.4 18 The court reasoned that the district court's
balancing test would allow an opponent to pierce a party's attorney-client
privilege covering an internal investigation merely by noticing a
deposition on the topic of the investigation's privileged nature.419 As the
court explained, "Barko noticed the deposition to cover the topic of the
COBC investigation itself, as distinguished from the events that were the
subject of the investigation."420 As KBR's corporate representative,
Heinrich had to read the COBC documents to adequately prepare for the
deposition.42 1
Barko could not defeat KBR's privilege by putting the COBC
investigation at issue in the deposition and then demanding to see the
privileged documents that Heinrich used to refresh his memory before
testifying.422 To so weaken the attorney-client privilege would be
unreasonable, and would potentially disrupt established internal
investigation practices and understandings.423
The decision in In re Kellogg, Brown & Root should hearten
observers who are concerned about erosion of the attorney-client
privilege-particularly in connection with internal investigations. But it
is no panacea; among other things, the opinion is heavily focused on the
privilege in internal investigations and further involved the preparation
of a corporate representative-both features that another court might
seize on to distinguish the case. In short, a party's ability to preserve the
414. Id.
415. Id. at 142-43.
416. Id. at 143-44 (quoting the district court).
417. Id. at 143.
418. Id at 144-45.
419. In re Kellog, Brown & Root, 796 F.3d at 144.
420. Id.
421. Id.
422. Id. at 145 (quoting Koch v. Cox, 489 F.3d 384, 391 (D.C. Cir. 2007)).
423. Id. (quoting FED. R. EvID. 501 and In re Kellogg, Brown & Root, Inc., 756 F.3d
754, 763 (D.C. Cir. 2014)).
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attorney-client privilege when her lawyer uses privileged materials to
prepare her to testify remains uncertain. As a result, lawyers should
generally avoid using privileged materials to refresh clients' memories
before they testify. In the case of corporate clients, the same advice
applies to the testimony of corporate representatives and employees. If it
is necessary to use a privileged document to refresh a witness's memory,
it may be possible to redact portions of the document before showing it
to the witness, thereby minimizing any potential harm resulting from its
d*424disclosure.
For lawyers taking depositions who hope to discover privileged
documents used by witnesses to refresh their memories, it is important to
lay the foundation for doing so. This requires them to establish that (1)
the witness used the document to refresh her memory; (2) the witness
used the document for purposes of testifying; and (3) the document
actually influenced the witness's testimony.425 The failure of any one of
these elements is fatal. Then, after laying the foundation, the lawyer still
must persuade a federal court, anyway, that justice requires the
document's disclosure.426
V. CONCLUSION
The attorney-client relationship is vital to the justice system. As
vital as it is, though, the privilege is not absolute. On the theory that the
attorney-client privilege is intended for use as a shield and not as a
sword, it may be lost to the at-issue exception if a litigant asserts a claim
or defense that requires inquiry into the litigant's privileged
communications with its lawyer to fairly rebut or refute. To be sure, the
at-issue exception is not the only exception to the privilege; indeed, the
privilege is riddled with exceptions and it may be easily waived. But the
at-issue exception represents "the most frightening type" of attorney-
client privilege forfeiture "because the law does not clearly warn clients
of its risk and because lawyers may not realize its effect in time to avoid
disaster.A27
Courts typically use one of three tests to decide whether a party has
placed its lawyer's advice at issue, thus triggering the at-issue exception
and exposing otherwise privileged communications to discovery by an
adversary. But only one of these-the Rhone Poulenc test-provides
424. John S. Applegate, Preparing for Rule 612, LITIG., Spring 1993, at 17, 21.
425. N. Natural Gas Co. v. Approx. 9117.53 Acres, 289 F.R.D. 644, 650 (D. Kan.
2013).
426. Hanover Ins. Co. v. Plaquemines Parish Gov't, 304 F.R.D. 494, 500 (E.D. La.
2015).
427. SPAHN, supra note 14, at 773.
58 [Vol. 121:1
THE FRIGHTENING AT-IssuE EXCEPTION
certainty and predictability when evaluating the possible application of
the at-issue exception. Only the Rhone-Poulenc test respects the
principle that courts determining whether the attorney-client privilege is
intact or whether it has somehow been lost should begin their analysis
with a presumption in favor of preserving the privilege.42 8 Until more
courts adopt this test, the at-issue exception will continue to ensnare
lawyers and litigants in circumstances where they least expect it. And
while some practice areas or types of litigation are more frightening than
others, and any claim or defense based in whole or part on a party's
subjective good faith creates special cause for alarm, all lawyers need to
better understand the at-issue exception to the attorney-client privilege.
428. Bertelsen v. Allstate Ins. Co., 796 N.W.2d 685, 703 (S.D. 2011).
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